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ABSTRACT 
The first biotechnology innovations in agriculture, such as herbicide resistant crops, 
took the form of cost reducing process innovations and were modeled as such. In recent 
years it became clear that these innovations are also product innovations in that they 
introduce altered, genetically modified final products to the market, and consumer 
preferences against the presence of GMOs in food drive the differentiation between products 
obtained using the conventional and biotechnology. I develop a new partial equilibrium four-
region world trade model for the soybean complex comprising soybeans, soybean oil and 
soybean meal, in which some consumers view genetically modified Roundup Ready (RR) 
soybeans and products as weakly inferior to conventional ones, the RR seed is patented and 
sold worldwide by a U.S. firm, and producers employ a costly segregation technology to 
separate conventional and biotech products in the supply chain. The calibrated model is 
solved for equilibrium prices, quantities, production patterns, trade flows and welfare 
changes under different assumptions regarding regional governments' production and trade 
policies, differentiated consumer tastes, and several other demand and supply parameters. 
Incomplete adoption of RR technology naturally arises in the free trade equilibrium, with the 
United States producing both soybean varieties. The United States, Argentina, Brazil and the 
Rest of the World all gain from the introduction of biotechnology. Price support programs 
for U.S. farmers, despite hurting the United States, have the potential to further improve 
world's efficiency. Compared to the free trade with no domestic bans, a ban on RR 
production in the Rest of the World improves that region's welfare at some levels of 
segregation costs but hurts the Unites States. Introduction of the same ban in Brazil benefits 
its farmers but makes the region worse off, and an import ban on RR products significantly 
reduces welfare of all agents. The distribution of welfare between consumers and producers 
appears to be sensitive to several parameters of the model, but region-level outcomes are 
robust with respect to most of them and are sensitive only to parameters defining the share of 
GMO-conscious consumers and elasticity of demands for conventional product varieties. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Rationale 
Recent biotechnology innovations in agriculture led to the introduction of improved 
crop varieties that belong to the class of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Genetic 
modification proved successful in seeds of such crops as corn/maize, soybeans, cotton, 
canola/rapeseed, and potato, and the growth rates of areas devoted to these transgenic crops 
have been very high in the last five years, as documented in James (1998,2000). The 
advantage of genetically modified (GM) crops marketed to date lies in the fact that the new 
genes inserted in the seed make them either tolerant to specific types of herbicides that can 
later be applied in the field to eradicate weeds, or make them toxic to pests that can attack the 
crop during its growth. These attributes of biotech crops reduce weed and pest management 
costs and thus have the potential of providing sizeable efficiency gains. 
In recent years it has become clear that, whereas genetic modification of seeds has 
brought about more cost-effective technology in the input market, it has also led some 
consumers to demand a choice between consuming biotech and nonbiotech final food 
products. In economic terms, this implies that biotechnology innovations that were originally 
thought to be just process innovations that do not introduce any new features to the final 
product - biotech foods have been determined to be "substantially equivalent" to their 
conventional counterparts by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration - turn out rather to be 
product innovations in light of the increasing public and political opposition to GMOs in 
Europe and elsewhere. Clearly, accommodation of this trend in subsequent research requires 
that we treat biotech innovations as product innovations, and the resulting product 
differentiation has important implications for modeling the economic impact of the diffusion 
of GMO crops. 
Differentiated demands will not be met unless the supply chain is able to deliver 
biotech and nonbiotech product varieties separately to the consumer. To address this issue, 
most of the recent literature on agricultural biotechnology has already shifted the focus from 
the benefits of the new technology to the costs of keeping it segregated alongside its 
2 
conventional counterpart as public and political opposition to importing grains produced 
using genetically modified seeds became widespread outside the United States, entered 
international regulatory bodies, and won a new legislation in the European Union explicitly 
aimed at regulating GMOs (Miller and Conko, 2000; Moschini and Corrigan, 1999). With 
GMOs being subject to labeling in Europe and soon in Australia, New Zealand, Japan and 
South Korea, the only way to provide consumers with a credible non-GMO alternative to a 
product that contains GMOs is to ensure that nonbiotech grain is properly separated in the 
supply chain using identity preservation (IP) or crop segregation techniques (Lin, Chambers 
and Harwood, 2000). 
Several models have recently attempted to incorporate differentiated final product 
demands and the supply-side biotech versus nonbiotech crop separation costs. These models 
vary in their approaches and issues addressed, but can be roughly grouped in two categories. 
An example of the first category is a simple model of the world canola market developed by 
Linder et al. (2001), with homogeneous farmers described by a two-input constant returns to 
scale, constant elasticity of substitution production function and heterogeneous consumers 
with constant elasticity demands. While being useful for analyzing welfare implications of 
introduction of GM product and various levels of segregation costs for consumers, producers 
and the world in general, such model, by being a one-good one-sector type model, cannot say 
anything about price, trade and welfare effects of the new technology in different parts of the 
world, and it is not very useful for common policy analysis. In short, the models in the first 
category are very aggregated. 
Examples of the second category are Nielsen and Anderson (2000) and Nielsen, 
Thierfelder and Robinson (2001). They build their analysis based on the global economy-
wide general equilibrium model and database - with the most recent data for 1995 - known 
as GTAP. GTAP splits the world in 45 regions and has 50 product sectors that can be 
aggregated if necessary. Although GTAP provides an exceptional richness of price, 
production and trade detail when analyzing a split of production into GM and GM-free lines 
or various policy actions, its existing applications have only one representative household in 
each region, which does not allow the analyst to separate consumer and producer welfare, 
and also makes it impossible to introduce differentiated demands. Nielsen, Thierfelder and 
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Robinson (2001), however, model consumer attitudes towards GM products by introducing a 
change in preferences, but this rules out standard welfare analysis.1 Also, by assuming 
perfect competition, GTAP does not treat realistically the market structure typical for most 
products affected by biotechnology. 
The limitations of existing models represent serious impediments to correctly 
capturing the crucial features of present agricultural markets and addressing the types of 
questions that are of interest to policymakers. First, welfare analysis, and not only the 
analysis of price, production and trade dynamics, is extremely important for supporting 
arguments in the discussion of the pros and cons of biotechnology in agriculture. To make it 
possible, as explained earlier, differentiated markets need to be introduced in the analysis 
consistently and not by means of preference changes. 
Secondly, models that are too aggregated are not suitable for analyzing the effects of 
rather diverse attitudes toward GMOs in different parts of the world. While the U.S. 
regulatory system has chosen a hands-off approach to GM foods manifested in the 
"substantial equivalence" approach used by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 
European governments have relied on the "precautionary principle" that also found its way 
into the Biosafety Protocol that was agreed upon in January 2000 (Moschini, 2001). 
Although the precautionary principle, by postulating that the lack of scientific evidence 
should not delay taking such precautionary steps as banning the product with, say, uncertain 
health implications, may be at odds with the rules under which countries-members of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) must operate, it tends to be widely adopted by European 
policymakers and has already led to actual bans of some GM crops. Clearly, this leaves the 
United States concerned with the consequences of EU biotechnology regulation. 
Finally, biotechnology innovations, having been developed by the private sector, are 
proprietary. The intellectual property rights (IPRs) for these innovations are protected by 
patents that give innovators a limited monopoly power that affects the provision of 
genetically modified seeds to farmers. This power translates into higher prices charged by 
biotech seed companies for transgenic seeds and subsequent monopoly profits. For example, 
1 Standard welfare calculations are meaningful only under the hypothesis of unchanged preferences (Hicks, 
1940). 
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the price markup on the Roundup Ready soybean seed - the so called "technology fee" - has 
been kept at around $6.50/bag during the last few years, representing approximately a 40 
percent markup on the price of conventional soybean seeds. Such monopolistic market 
structure in the input market cannot be ignored in the welfare analysis because, as Moschini 
and Lapan (1997) demonstrate, it would lead to overestimation of welfare gains due to 
innovation. The correct approach is to introduce the structure of the input market into a 
model and add the innovator-monopolist's profits in the input market to consumer and 
producer surplus measured in the output market in order to obtain correct welfare measure. 
With chances of the emergence of sizable differentiated markets for grains becoming 
increasingly high, there is a clear need for a research framework that avoids the shortcomings 
of the existing models. Table 1.1 shows the results of a recent survey of a representative 
sample of 16,000 citizens of the European Union conducted on behalf of their member 
governments in order to assess the extent of consumer opposition to GM foods. These results 
overwhelmingly confirm the existence of a sizeable customer base with differentiated 
preferences. Fifty-five percent of those polled disagree that genetically modified food is not 
dangerous and fifty-nine percent believe that it can negatively impact the environment. Also, 
ninety-five percent of the respondents want to have the right to choose between biotech and 
nonbiotech products, which is exactly what the differentiated markets will offer. 
Table 1.1. Results of the 2001 Opinion Poll Conducted by the 15 EU Member States 
Would you say that you are more inclined to agree or 
disagree with each of the following propositions on 
genetically modified foods? (% EU 15) 
Inclined 
to Agree 
Inclined 
Not to 
Agree 
Did Not 
Know 
I want to have the right to choose 94.6 2.5 2.8 
I want to know more about this kind of food before eating it 85.9 9.3 4.8 
They should only be introduced if it is scientifically proven that 85.8 8.0 6.1 
they are harmless 
I do not want this type of food 70.9 16.9 12.2 
They could have negative effects on the environment 59.4 11.9 28.7 
The dangers have been exaggerated by the media 33.1 44.3 22.6 
This kind of food does not present any particular danger 14.6 54.8 30.6 
Source: Eurobarometer (2001). 
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New research being carried out in this direction includes Desquilbet and Bullock 
(2001), who provide preliminary analysis of potential adoption of GM rapeseed with non-
GMO market segregation in the European Union. Their model looks at individual 
consumers, crop handlers and farmers who differentiate between biotech and nonbiotech 
varieties to build up market supply and demand functions. This approach allows the 
researches to circumvent the problem of insufficient data for aggregate demand and supply 
calibrations. The model splits the world in two regions and is expected to be useful for 
answering welfare and policy questions. 
Another example is Lapan and Moschini (2002), who build a two-country partial 
equilibrium model of an agricultural industry to analyze some implications of the 
introduction of GM products. In the model, one country, with consumers indifferent between 
biotech and nonbiotech products, develops a new GM crop and adopts it, and the second 
country, with consumers who view the GM crop as a product weakly inferior to the non-GM 
one, is the importing country (it does not produce the GM crop) that has the ability to impose 
regulations and/or protectionist policies to limit its exposure to GMOs. This model is free of 
the three identified above major drawbacks of other existing research studies and provides 
analytical answers to questions about welfare impacts of introduction of GM products and 
subsequent protective policies of an importing country. 
In this dissertation I develop a four-region world trade model that can also provide 
answers to most vital questions in conjunction with continuing production of GM crops in 
differentiated and segregated markets. The model is specifically tailored to the world 
soybean industry, which allows it to offer concrete estimates of the impacts of biotechnology 
in the market for soybeans and soybean products. In this model, the four regions produce, 
consume and trade a limited number of related products. Some of these products exist in two 
varieties: conventional and biotech. Unlike in Desquilbet and Bullock (2001), producer and 
consumer decisions are modeled explicitly in each region using aggregate demand and 
supply specifications. Linear regional demands are allowed to be differentiated or not 
depending on the region-specific consumer preferences, and the two varieties of a product are 
produced and delivered separately to consumers using costly segregation technology. The 
adoption rate of biotech product by its producers is determined endogenously in each region 
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and not fixed by assumption as in most other studies2. One of the inputs in biotech 
production process is noncompetitively supplied by the innovator-monopolist residing in one 
of the regions. Both spatial and vertical equilibrium conditions are used to complete the 
model. The model is then calibrated, solved and simulated to study various policy scenarios. 
The restrictions on the particular parameter values used at the calibration stage are studied 
through an extensive sensitivity analysis. 
The questions that can be addressed by the model include the direction of price 
changes and trade flows in biotech and nonbiotech markets, associated welfare distribution in 
different parts of the world and among consumers, producers and innovator-monopolist, and 
the effect of relevant government policies on both trade and welfare under different 
assumptions about market structure, differentiated consumer tastes, and other demand and 
supply conditions. A more detailed description of the model and scenarios that will be 
studied using it is provided in the next section. A brief overview of the world market for 
soybeans and soybean products is offered first in order to illustrate the main issues facing the 
soybean complex and relate them to modeling choices. 
1.2. Research Focus: The Soybean Complex 
Soybeans are one of the major oilseed crops along with cottonseed, rapeseed (canola), 
and sunflowerseed. Processed soybeans are the largest source of protein feed and vegetable 
oil in the world, and the United States is the world's largest soybean producer and exporter 
(see Table 1.2). Although the United States has always maintained the leading position in 
the world soybean markets, its share of global soybean and soybean product exports has 
steadily diminished in the past two decades, according to USD A statistics. One of the 
reasons for that is the emergence of the countries of South America, particularly Brazil and 
Argentina, as the second and third largest soybean producers in the world. In 1998-1999 
crop year, Brazil produced 31 million metric tons (MT) of soybeans, Argentina - 20 million 
MT, and the United States - almost 75 million. Brazil and Argentina represent more than 90 
2 In Lapan and Moschini (2002), the adoption in the importing country is set to zero, which in the language of 
this model is equivalent to the special case of the production ban on the GM product in the importing region. 
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Table 1.2. Soybean Production and Utilization, 1998-1999 (Million MT) 
Area Net A in Direct 
(mil. Ha) Yield Production Exports Stocks Use Crush 
World 71.16 2.25 161.67 NA 2.39 23.58 135.70 
United States 28.51 2.62 74.60 21.82 4.05 5.47 43.26 
South America 22.93 2.41 55.34 12.89 -0.27 2.43 40.29 
Argentina 8.17 2.45 20.00 2.70 -0.16 0.66 16.80 
Brazil 12.90 2.43 31.30 8.27 -0.09 1.52 21.60 
Paraguay 1.20 2.50 3.00 2.30 0.00 0.05 0.65 
Rest of the World 19.72 1.61 31.73 -34.71 -1.39 15.68 52.15 
European Union 0.52 2.95 1.53 -16.07 -0.16 1.53 16.23 
China 8.50 1.78 15.16 -3.66 -1.11 7.32 12.61 
Japan 0.11 1.45 0.15 -4.81 -0.02 1.28 3.70 
Mexico 0.09 1.59 0.14 -3.76 -0.08 0.03 3.95 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture (2002a). 
percent of the South America's soybean production, with Paraguay producing 75 percent of 
the remaining volume. 
Only a small share of U.S., Brazilian and Argentine soybean production is consumed 
directly in the form of seed, on-farm dairy feed and direct food uses such as tofu. A 
relatively larger share is exported to the Rest of the World consisting of the European Union, 
China, Japan, Mexico and other, smaller importing countries, with the EU being the world's 
single largest soybean importer. But for the most part soybeans are crushed to extract the 
soybean oil and meal. 
Soybean oil constitutes approximately 18-19 percent of the soybean's weight and has 
both food and industrial uses. It accounts for about two-thirds of the vegetable oils and 
animal fat consumed in the United States, and is used mainly in salad and cooking oil, bakery 
shortening, and margarine. As in the case with soybeans, the United States, Argentina and 
Brazil are the three leading producers of soybean oil (see Table 1.3). Most of it is consumed 
at home but some - around 20 percent of worldwide production - is imported by the Rest of 
the World. Notably, the European Union is self-sufficient in soybean oil production, but 
many other countries import oil, including China and the countries of the Middle East and 
North Africa. 
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Table 1.3. Soybean Oil Production and Utilization, 1998-1999 (Million MT) 
Net A in 
Production Exports Stocks Consumption 
World 24.56 NA -0.02 24.58 
United States 8.20 1.04 0.06 7.10 
South America 7.55 3.78 -0.02 3.79 
Argentina 3.16 3.08 -0.02 0.10 
Brazil 4.04 1.22 0.00 2.82 
Paraguay 0.12 0.09 -0.00 0.04 
Rest of the World 8.81 -4.82 -0.06 13.69 
European Union 2.92 1.06 0.03 1.83 
China 2.05 -0.87 -0.16 3.08 
Mid East/N Africa 0.26 -1.64 0.03 1.87 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture (2002a). 
Soybean meal is the most valuable product obtained from soybean processing. It is 
the world's dominant high-protein feed, accounting for nearly 65 percent of world supplies 
(U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2002b). About 98 percent of soybean meal consumption is 
used for livestock feed, and the remainder is used in human foods such as bakery ingredients 
and meat substitutes. As illustrated by Table 1.4, the European Union is the largest importer 
of soybean meal, and trade in that market flows from the United States, Brazil and Argentina 
to the Rest of the World. 
Table 1.4. Soybean Meal Production and Utilization, 1998-1999 (Million MT) 
Net A in 
Production Exports Stocks Consumption 
World 108.36 NA 0.99 107.37 
United States 34.29 6.37 0.11 27.81 
South America 32.19 22.01 0.15 10.03 
Argentina 13.69 13.22 0.02 0.45 
Brazil 17.01 9.98 0.13 6.90 
Paraguay 0.51 0.41 0.00 0.10 
Rest of the World 41.88 -28.38 0.73 69.53 
European Union 12.92 -14.91 0.17 27.66 
China 10.03 -1.39 0.00 11.42 
Mid East/N Africa 1.23 -3.70 0.01 4.92 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture (2002a). 
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In summary, the world's soybean market consists of the three closely related 
products: soybeans, soybean oil, and soybean meal. These three products form what is called 
the soybean complex which will be the subject of further analysis of this dissertation. The 
main players in the soybean complex in terms of their production and trading status are the 
United States, South America, and the Rest of the World. 
Soybeans have been among the first crops that took advantage of agricultural 
biotechnology. Since their commercial introduction in 1996, herbicide-tolerant Roundup 
Ready soybeans gained rapid acceptance among U.S. and Argentine farmers (see Table 1.5). 
In the 1998-1999 marketing year, the adoption rate was 36% in the United States and more 
than double that in Argentina, and both rates continued to grow in subsequent years. The 
adoption of agricultural biotechnology thus constitutes another important dimension based on 
which one soybean region can be differentiated from another. In South America, Brazil and 
Argentina took different paths with respect to adopting Roundup Ready soybeans due to 
different government policies. It is therefore important to account for these differences in 
current and possible future regional policies by separating South America into two regions. 
Thus, in addition to the United States and the Rest of the World, the present model 
distinguishes the regions that I call Brazil and Argentina. Brazil region includes the 
countries of Brazil and Paraguay, while Argentina region includes all other countries of 
Table 1.5. Acreage and Adoption of RR Soybeans (Million Ha) 
1997 1998 1999 2000 
Adoption Rate 
1998-1999" 
World 5.1 14.5 21.6 25.8 
Unites States 3.6 10.2 15.0 16.5 0.36 
South America 1.4 4.3 6.4 9.1 
Brazil 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Paraguay 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 
Argentina 1.4 4.3 6.4 9.1 0 72 Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Rest of the World 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.00 
8 Marketing year (September - August) 
Source: James (1998,2000) 
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South America. This ensures that Brazil and Argentina regions cover all of South America, 
while the Rest of the World represents European and Asian markets. 
Some of the groundwork for the forthcoming analysis has been already done by 
Moschini, Lapan and Sobolevsky (2000), who developed a model to evaluate the welfare 
effects of the Roundup Ready (RR) technology for soybean production. That analysis was 
carried out under the assumption - unsatisfactory in light of the present discussion - that RR 
soybeans represented a process innovation and therefore conventional and RR soybean, 
soybean oil and soybean meal varieties were perfect substitutes in consumption. By dividing 
the world into three regions, the United States, South America and the Rest of the World, 
they estimated welfare effects - properly accounting for the proprietary nature of the RR 
technology - for different adoption patterns and market structures. 
The goal of this dissertation is to capitalize on the Moschini, Lapan and Sobolevsky 
model and take it to the next level by increasing its dimensionality, introducing differentiated 
linear demands in the Rest of the World, providing a modeling capability to have 
differentiated linear demands in the other three regions as well, and simulating a series of 
relevant policy scenarios. In the model, product differentiation applies only to soybeans and 
soybean oil because, to date, there is no empirical evidence of biotech-based product 
differentiation in the soybean meal sector as almost none of it is used in the production of 
human food. Differentiated demands for soybeans and soybean oil exist because of the 
underlying heterogeneity of consumers in the respective regions, resulting in the RR variety 
being weakly inferior to the conventional one so that while at equal prices both varieties are 
still consumed, the demand for the RR variety vanishes as its price exceeds the price of the 
conventional counterpart. As such, the RR product represents a peculiar type of product 
innovation - one that is simultaneously cost-reducing to farmers and carrying a negative 
value in the product's characteristics space of some consumers. 
The specification of supply is based on Moschini, Lapan and Sobolevsky (2000) and 
is extended to account for costs of separating RR and conventional soybeans along the supply 
chain. It is assumed that this separation is achieved by a constant-cost segregation 
technology. RR soybean seed is sold by an innovator-monopolist at a premium. Also, the 
model takes into account government price support policy available to U.S. farmers in the 
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form of marketing assistance loans and Loan Deficiency Payments (LDPs), which have 
become quite important in the last few years. 
The model is calibrated such as to predict prices and quantities in the soybean 
complex for the crop year 1998-99, the most recent complete year when the analysis was 
undertaken, and is solved for several scenarios. First, there is a free trade scenario with no 
government intervention in any region. This scenario provides estimates of worldwide RR 
adoption rates that are based on private economic decisions and shows how welfare of agents 
changes with the introduction of the RR technology. Also, it serves as a point of comparison 
for the regional production and import policy scenarios and allows to evaluate their economic 
efficiency. 
The second scenario looks at the case of a production subsidy in the United States. 
The interest in this scenario is not purely theoretical because, as explained in Chapter 3, this 
subsidy has been sizable over the past several years and provided a boost to the soybean 
acreage in the United States. Taking the form of LDPs, the subsidy has the objective of 
providing a revenue floor to farmers and is expected to offer the same price to both 
conventional and RR soybean producers. This provides an incentive to U.S. farmers to grow 
only less costly RR soybeans and can in theory lead to immiserizing growth. 
The next three scenarios look at production bans on RR soybeans and soybean 
products in the Rest of the World and Brazil individually and together. The Rest of the World 
region includes the countries of the European Union, Japan and several others that have 
already adopted regulations prohibiting production of unapproved biotech crops that led to a 
de facto ban on all biotech production in the region. Similarly, Brazil to date has not adopted 
RR soybeans despite their wide popularity in the neighboring Argentina and is seen as trying 
to differentiate itself from other soybean exporting nations by establishing itself as a biotech-
free soybean region and thus avoiding segregation costs. Therefore, these ban scenarios 
represent the reality of today's soybean industry and the question of interest is whether these 
policies are justified from an economic point of view and what is their impact on the United 
States. 
Not only can the Rest of the World impose a production ban, but it can also choose to 
ban consumption of RR products altogether. This may happen, for example, in response to a 
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GMO scare similar to the infamous StarLink fiasco, when a GM corn variety not approved 
for human consumption found its way into food products because of a failed segregation 
procedure. Or, imports of the RR variety may cease because of prohibitively expensive 
mandatory labeling requirements imposed by the Rest of the World's regulators. In any case, 
the implications of an import ban in the Rest of the World must be severe for such exporting 
regions as the United States and Argentina, as they will have to divest themselves from 
optimally high levels of adoption of the RR technology. I consider two scenarios with the 
import ban in the Rest of the World: one with Brazil implementing the simultaneous RR 
production ban and one without. 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. A short survey of the literature on 
modeling product differentiation along with detailed specification of the demand function 
used in the present model is provided in Chapter 2. Supply side discussion is provided in 
Chapter 3. Chapter 4 analyzes the trade and market equilibrium conditions. Calibration of 
the model's parameters is discussed in Chapter 5, and analysis of results in different policy 
scenarios is offered in Chapter 6. Sensitivity analysis of major findings is provided in 
Chapter 7, followed by conclusions in Chapter 8. Appendices and references conclude the 
dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 2. THE MODEL: DEMAND 
Introducing a product innovation in the agricultural trade model requires specifying 
its aggregate demand system (a.d.s.) so that two separate downward-sloping demands - for 
conventional and RR varieties - exist in the post-innovation period both for soybeans and 
soybean oil. Also, the pre-innovation demand for the conventional variety and the post-
innovation demand for the de facto RR variety in the world with no segregation technology 
should satisfy the same preferences to permit welfare calculations. Thus, in this model the 
demand specification will rely on standard approaches used in modeling new and 
differentiated goods. 
2.1. New and Differentiated Products 
A conceptual difficulty with analyzing the welfare implications of new products lies 
in the fact that such analysis requires comparing pre- and post-innovation states of the world 
that have different dimensions in product space. This issue has received the closest attention 
in the literature concerning proper measurement of the cost-of-living index in the face of new 
or disappearing goods (e.g., Feenstra 1994, Hausman 1999). Oi (1997) traces back the roots 
of the proposed solution to works of Fisher and Shell (1968), who showed that new products 
can be consistently modeled by being entered in the pre-innovation product space with their 
market prices set to reservation (also called "choke") values, that is, the hypothetical prices at 
which their derived demands equal zero. 
The two distinguished types of product differentiation are horizontal and vertical. If 
two products can be described by a set of characteristics, then they are horizontally 
differentiated when the first contains more of some characteristics and less of the others 
relative to the second product, so that rational consumers may like more the first or the 
second product depending on what characteristics are relatively more valuable to them. The 
two products are vertically differentiated when the first contains more of some or all 
characteristics relative to the second product, so that rational consumers, ceteris paribus, 
would always select the first. 
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The two leading groups of models that are used in studying product differentiation are 
the product characteristics models (e.g., Hotelling, 1929; Lancaster, 1979; see also Helpman 
and Krugman, 1989) and the traditional consumer-theory models (e.g., Dixit and Stiglitz, 
1977; see also Helpman and Krugman, 1989). The models can also be distinguished by 
whether consumers are considered to be heterogeneous or homogeneous. Consumer 
heterogeneity is modeled by introducing a statistical distribution either over income or some 
parameter describing the individual consumers' preference towards a product characteristic. 
Both vertical and horizontal differentiation can be modeled with either specification of 
consumers. 
Whereas product characteristics models usually require quite detailed modeling of 
individual consumer preferences, traditional consumer-theory models of product 
differentiation tend to be too symmetric to realistically represent substitution patterns among 
product varieties (Hausman, 1997). As such, they are not suitable for most aggregate-level 
models of differentiated markets. In the latter models, one would like to specify an aggregate 
demand system that meets some particular research agenda and not bother with the details of 
individual agents' behavior. A relevant question in that case is whether the chosen a.d.s. 
specification is consistent with a preference structure that describes particular consumer 
behavior in a differentiated market. Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1989) attempt to 
answer this question by investigating conditions under which an aggregate demand system 
for differentiated products can be derived from a characteristics model with heterogeneous 
consumers. They consider the a.d.s. that satisfy gross substitutes property and successfully 
show that the systems with aggregate demands that (!) are functions of price differences, or 
(ii) are derived from the CES utility, or (iii) have the form O, = f,(P,)[^fj(Pj), where 
can be reconciled with some characteristics model with heterogeneous consumers. 
Unfortunately, they cannot say anything about a.d.s. of other forms, including linear. 
Therefore, when the linear demand system is introduced below, direct references to an 
underlying preference structure of a representative consumer will be made. 
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2.2. Demand Specification 
GMO labeling requirements introduced by the European Union and other countries, 
coupled with the availability of technology to test for GMO content, an increasing interest by 
food companies in identity preservation of genetically unmodified food ingredients 
(Ballenger, Bohman and Gehlhar, 2000; Cachet et al., 1999; Lin, Chambers and Harwood, 
2000), and the apparent existence of a large mass of consumers conscious about consuming 
GM foods (Table 1.1) generate conditions for the emergence of separate demands for 
conventional and RR soybeans and soybean products. Underlying that, of course, is the 
presumption that some consumers are willing to pay to access foods that are free of 
genetically modified ingredients. As discussed earlier, consumers are likely to have such a 
preference because of health risk concerns about GM foods, because of concerns for the 
environment (for example, worsened biodiversity), and because of ethical reservations about 
genetically manipulated living organisms. Hence, the reasonable conclusion is that, at 
present, RR soybeans and soybean products are perceived in differentiated markets as 
imperfect and weakly inferior substitutes to the conventional varieties. 
To understand better the notion of weakly inferior substitutes, let 0°  (p°  , p ] )  be the 
aggrega te  demand  fo r  good  0  and  Q\p° ,p ]  )  be  the  aggrega te  demand  fo r  good  1 ,  w i th  p°  
and px denoting their respective prices. Note that Lapan and Moschini (2002) provide a 
clear discussion of what is meant by "weakly inferior," and define the aggregate demands 
Q°(p°,p]) and Q\p°,p]) from a population of consumers with heterogeneous tastes and 
quasilinear preferences. In what follows, good 0 represents the conventional (traditional) 
soybean product of interest, and good 1 represents the corresponding RR soybean product. 
Assuming that these goods are measured in the same physical units, if goods 0 and 1 were 
perfect substitutes their indifference curve would be a straight 45-degree line illustrated in 
Figure Al, Appendix A. Were these goods to be imperfect substitutes, on the other hand, the 
indifference curve would look like that in Figure A2, reflecting the notion that, as more and 
more of one good is consumed, the consumer would be willing to give up an increasing 
amount of that good in exchange for a unit of the second good (at a fixed level of utility), i.e., 
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the marginal rate of substitution is decreasing. An important feature of the general 
substitution case is that both goods are typically consumed at the relevant prices. 
When goods are imperfect substitutes, but ceteris paribus good 0 is always preferred 
to good 1, the indifference curve of the representative consumer may be represented as in 
Figure A3. Note that in this case preferences are strictly convex (reducing consumption of 
good 0 by a unit always requires more than one unit increase in consumption of good 1 to 
keep the utility constant). For the consumer to demand a positive quantity of the new 
product, therefore, it must be that p} <p°. And, as illustrated by the associated demand 
curve represented in Figure A4, demand for the new product vanishes at px =p°. Whereas 
the presentation of preferences in Figures A3-A4 can be consistent with our prior beliefs on 
the structure of GM and non-GM food demand, it is perhaps overly restrictive. For example, 
if we think of the aggregated demands Q°(p°,p]) and Q\p°,p]) arising from a population 
of consumers with heterogeneous attitudes towards GMOs, the foregoing structure would 
seem to rule out that some consumers may be perfectly indifferent between good 0 and good 
1 as long as px = p°. To allow for this possibility we can modify the preference ordering of 
the representative consumer as in Figure A5, where the flat region on the indifference curve 
allows for a portion of demand to be indifferent in the sense just discussed. As the associated 
demand curve in Figure A6 makes clear, some nonzero demand for the new good is possible 
at  p ]  =p°, although demand for the new product vanishes if  p ]  > p°.  
Based on the foregoing discussion, I specify a demand system for conventional and 
RR differentiated products that allows for gross substitution, weak preference for the 
conventional good, and some degree of indifference between the two goods. The following 
parameterizations apply to any product in any region, but for notational simplicity the 
subscripts denoting a product and a region are omitted in this section. 
Adopting a linear specification (without wealth effects) for Q°(p°,p l)  and 
Qx (p°,/?'), the demand functions for conventional and RR soybean products are written as: 
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where all parameters are strictly positive. Note that the symmetry condition is maintained, 
such that this demand system is integrable into well defined (quasi-linear) preferences, a 
condition that will become important when making welfare evaluations. The total demand 
that is implied by this structure is: 
(2.2) 0T = (a0 + or, ) - (b0 - c)p° - (6, - c)p ]  
Note that the curvature conditions associated with (2.1), b0  > c and 6, > c, imply that 
the total demand is non-increasing in either price. Also, note that at p° = p] (2.1) gives 
Q] = <2, — (6, - c)p° (subject to p° < a, /(6, -c) ). This is the maximum quantity that 
"indifferent" consumers buy of RR product at these prices, and if they buy less, the 
difference must be covered by purchases of conventional variety. Therefore: 
, ,  , ,  Q" s k- ( b« ~C)P.  to, +<!,)-(6, +6, ~2c)p) 1 
(2
'
3) ele{0,„,-(6,-c>} i lfP-" ~P 
With p° < p ]  demand for O1 vanishes, and: 
(2.4) =("•>+«,>-(»„ +b,~2c)P° j, jfp,<pl 
Q — 0 
The underlying preferences are described by the quasilinear indirect utility function: 
(2.5) V(p°,p ] , I)  = I~^a0p° +a xp x  -  —b0(p°)~ ~—b :(p l)~ +cp°p l  
where I  is income and the price of the numeraire good is normalized to one. 
A graphic illustration of the system (2.1) - (2.4) is given in Figures A7 and A8, 
Appendix A. Bold lines in Figure A7 trace the demand for the conventional variety when 
RR price is fixed at a particular level p1 marked on vertical axes. For a higher /?', 
conventional demand traces a dashed 0°. Similarly, the demand for the RR variety in 
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Figure A8 traces the bold lines when conventional price is fixed at marked level p° , and 
dashed l ines (0 ])  when conventional price goes up to p°.  
Following the standard approach of dealing with new products discussed in Chapter 
2.1, the specification in equation (2.4) will be used to describe the differentiated market 
before the introduction of RR products,  with RR reservation price implicit ly set  above p° 
(i.e., we imagine that new technology is possible but prohibitively expensive). When the 
new technology is adopted, no matter how incompletely, and the RR and conventional 
varieties are not separated in the supply chain, the effective demand for conventional product 
is assumed to be zero (I postulate that this case reflects the fact that the price that must be 
paid to ensure that the consumed product is GM-free is prohibitively high). To describe this 
scenario, for any given p1 the "choke" price p° = (a0 + cp])/b0 drives the demand for 
conventional product to zero. Therefore: 
0 = 0  
(2.6) O = a,  + can  \ - Û  
< "o y 
Note that the conditions b0>c and b x> c ensure that this demand is also downward 
sloping. 
A complete specification of the demand system (2.1) - (2.4) for all prices in the 
nonnegative quadrant of 9?2 is represented in Figures A9 and A10. Two distinct 
specifications arise depending on the relative values of demand parameters. By comparison, 
the general two-good linear demand system specification is represented in Figure A10. 
For later use, the price elasticities of differentiated demands for the case p° > p x  are 
defined as: 
(2.7) s " s x 0  —  c ~ ^  ,  s ° °  ~ - b 0 ^ - ,  and sox 
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It may also be useful to define an aggregate elasticity, call it a scale elasticity, that 
tells us how total demand (for conventional and RR varieties) reacts to scaling of all prices: 
(2.8) £r = 8gr((P>') < 
Z=1 
-{bp ~c)pT -fa ~c)p7 
dt Q r  
Finally, the undifferentiated demand is assumed to have a linear functional form: 
(2.9) Q"{p) = a-bp 
where p is either the own price of undifferentiated soybean meal or the price of the cheaper 
or the only available variety (could be a conventional variety) in a region inhabited by 
consumers who do not have differentiated tastes. The own price elasticity of the demand 
(2.9) is defined as: 
(2.10) s1"' = -b p!Qu . 
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CHAPTER 3. THE MODEL: SUPPLY 
A parsimonious specification of the soybean supply function that accounts for the 
main features of soybean production practices, reflects the nature of biotechnology 
innovation in the soybean industry and is suitable for calibration purposes was developed in 
Moschini, Lapan and Sobolevsky (2000). This specification is briefly restated below, and its 
extensions necessary for the analysis of scenarios concerned with in this dissertation are 
discussed next. 
3.1. Undifferentiated and Non-segregated Market 
Moschini, Lapan and Sobolevsky (2000) assume homogeneous soybean farmers who 
have the choice of growing conventional or RR soybeans or both, who are not required to 
segregate the two varieties during production process and who therefore receive the same 
price for either variety. The aggregate soybean supply function is written as YR = L- y, 
where YB is total production consisting of a mix of conventional and RR soybeans, L is land 
allocated to soybeans, and y denotes yield (production per hectare).3 Production per hectare 
depends on the use of seeds x and of all other inputs z. It is assumed that the per-hectare 
production function /(z, x) requires a constant optimal density of seeds S (amount of seed 
per unit of land), irrespective of the use of other inputs, for all likely levels of input and 
output prices. Hence, the variable profit function (per hectare), defined as: 
(3.1) Ji(pB  ,r ,w)=max{p s/(z, x)-r-  z  -  wx] 
is written in the additive form: 
(3.2) n{pB  ,r ,w) = x(pB ,r)-dw 
3 Analysis in this section applies to any region. The subscript denoting a region is omitted here and elsewhere 
in this section for notational simplicity. 
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where pB  is the price of soybeans, r is the price vector of all inputs (excluding land and 
seed), and w is the price of soybean seed. These assumptions imply that the (optimal) yield 
function does not depend on the price of seed: 
dpB  dpB  
Land devoted to soybeans is the result of an optimal land allocation problem that 
depends on net returns (profit per hectare) of soybeans and of other competing crops, as well 
as the total availability of land. If all other unit profits (and total land) are treated as constant 
they can be subsumed in the functional representation: 
(3.4) L = L(?Z) 
Thus, total supply of soybeans is written as: 
(3.5) Yb  = L (7T{pB  ,r )-8W)- y(pB ,  r)  
The new RR technology is embedded in the seed. By assumption the amount of seed 
used per hectare is constant, but the new technology is assumed superior such that, at all 
relevant input price levels (and excluding seed price), the profit per hectare is increased. 
That is, if the superscripted 1 denotes the new technology and 0 the old one, then: 
(3.6) x\pB ,r)>x\pB ,r)  
Specifically, the two per-hectar profit functions are parameterized as follows: 
(3.7) =A +—p\+ n-Sw 
I + 77 
for the conventional technology, and 
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(3.8) k x  =A + a+ ^  + - Sw(\ + ju) for the RR technology, 
I + 77 
where 77 is the elasticity of yield with respect to soybean price; A, G - parameters subsuming 
all other input prices, presumed constant; fi — coefficient of yield change due to the RR 
technology; a - coefficient of unit profit increase due to the RR technology; and, p -
markup on RR seed price charged by the innovator-monopolist who developed the RR 
technology (reflects technology fee). Therefore, the unit profit advantage of the new 
technology can be written as 
(3.9) A7r = a+Y^-plgn -wS/i 
It is useful to note that this formulation allows the new technology to affect yield 
(through the parameter /? ), and profit per hectare is affected through this parameter and, 
separately, through the parameter a. The yield functions are y° = GpnB for the conventional 
technology and y = (1 + fî)Gp% for the RR one. 
Moschini, Lapan and Sobolevsky (2000) make no attempt to model the innovator-
monopolist's optimizing behavior and the new technology's diffusion process leading to a 
complete adoption of RR soybeans in this non-segregated market setting. Instead, they rely 
on the observed behavior of agents and set RR seed markup and adoption rates exogenously. 
Thus, for an exogenously given adoption rate of RR technology p e [0,1], measured as 
a share of RR soybean acres in total land devoted to soybeans, and the non-segregated 
soybean price pB the average profit per hectare is: 
(3.10) Jc = A + pa + ^ + P^° p- ôw{\ + pju) 
I + 77 
such that the corresponding average yield is y = (1 + p{3)GpnB. Supply of land to the soybean 
industry is written in constant-elasticity form as a function of average land rents that depend 
on output price and adoption rates, that is: 
(3.11) L = >lit6 
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where 6 is the elasticity of land supply with respect to soybean profit per hectare, and X is 
scale parameter. For calibration purposes, it is more convenient to express 9 in terms of 
more readily observed elasticity of land supply with respect to soybean prices y/ : 
(3.12) 6  = y /  =  r y / ,  
where r is the farmer's rent share in unit revenue. Finally, the aggregate supply of soybeans 
in a non-segregated market is written as: 
(3.13) r*=A A + pa + ^  + P^G p^" - SwQ. + p//) 
1 + 7 
(i+^)Q? 
As was mentioned before, this model is based on the assumption that farmers are 
homogeneous. Clearly, this assumption is a simplification. Although recent analysis by 
OECD (1999) confirms that this modeling approach is appropriate in that the RR technology 
seems to benefit farmers by reducing costs and, to a lesser extent, by increasing yields, which 
is often offset by the technology fees paid to seed companies, this general result is subject to 
high variation on a farm level, and as Nielsen and Anderson (2000) point out, adoption of RR 
soybeans should be explained, at least in part, by heterogeneity of farm characteristics, 
preference for simplifying the production process and expectation of advantages of early 
adoption due to learning. To keep analysis tractable and the scope of the dissertation 
manageable, these considerations are not developed further in what follows. 
3.2. The Market with Differentiated Products and Segregation Costs 
The requirement to maintain two distinct - conventional ("nonbiotech") and RR 
("biotech") - varieties of soybeans in order to serve differentiated soybean product markets 
gives rise to additional production and marketing costs associated mainly with the nonbiotech 
variety - the costs that would not exist otherwise. While it is possible that producers of 
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biotech soybeans may be required to bear some additional cost, for example the cost of 
mandatory labeling, it is obvious that soybean consumers who do not have differentiated 
tastes (or, equivalently, regard the biotech and nonbiotech products as perfect substitutes) 
will be indifferent between consuming nonbiotech and biotech varieties. Consequently, it 
will be the production and marketing chain of nonbiotech soybeans that will bear most of the 
additional cost, as only GMO-conscious consumers will demand certification that the product 
they consume is free from genetically modified material at a particular tolerance level (Golan 
and Kuchler, 2000)/ 
From this standpoint, the voluntary efforts of nonbiotech producers and marketers are 
all that is needed to have both product varieties available in the marketplace. However, as 
Lapan and Moschini (2002) point out in their paper, mandatory labeling that imposes an 
additional, wasteful cost on the biotech market segment cannot be ruled out completely 
because it is actually being implemented in the European Union, possibly as a protectionist 
measure. In what follows, however, I do not model explicitly the impact of additional 
regulatory costs that can be imposed on RR soybean and soybean product imports. 
Indirectly, these costs can be accounted for in the model by appropriately adjusting the 
estimated profit advantage of the RR technology in the exporting regions, but quantifying 
them is a difficult task at present as data is scarce. In the event of prohibitively high 
regulatory costs the biotech exports will simply cease, which will be equivalent to an import 
ban discussed at length in Chapter 6. Thus, the model's attention is focused on the cost of 
separating GM-free products in the supply and marketing chain. 
Separation of nonbiotech soybeans can be accomplished by either crop segregation or 
identity preservation (Lin, Chambers and Harwood, 2000). Crop segregation requires 
separation of nonbiotech beans at all levels of production and the supply chain, from planting 
through harvest, storage and transportation, at the expense of additional cleaning of 
equipment, cleaning or maintaining separate storage facilities and testing for biotech content 
4 There exists a theoretical possibility that in regions with low levels of adoption of RR technology biotech 
soybean producers and the marketing chain will be mandated to bear most of the additional cost of ensuring 
their product's separation from the nonbiotech varieties. However, the successful practical implementation of 
such mandate and its enforcement that would instill the desired confidence in the purity of conventional 
soybeans seems very unlikely. 
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at various points in the marketing system. Identity preservation is a more stringent system 
that typically involves containerized shipping. 
Some of these additional costs may stay constant but others are likely to diminish per 
unit of output as the scale of nonbiotech production increases. As nonbiotech demand 
becomes more sizeable, there would be more elevators in the vicinity of any given soybean 
farm operation willing to accept nonbiotech soybeans, which may be expected to reduce 
farmers' transportation costs. For as much as 95% of U.S. elevators, separating nonbiotech 
soybeans is likely to require new investments (Lin, Chambers and Harwood, 2000), and in 
other regions of the world the situation should be similar, implying processing economies of 
scale. Even with existing facilities, elevators should enjoy economies of scale as costs of 
maintaining separate loading, unloading and storage facilities or routine cleaning of common 
facilities before accepting nonbiotech crop, as well as costs of "storing air" will fall per ton 
of nonbiotech soybeans if its quantity were to increase. Economies of scale in shipping, 
especially if it is containerized, may be less evident unless shipments of nonbiotech soybeans 
are so small that such commonly used means of transportation as unit trains of about 100 cars 
or river barges cannot be fully utilized. 
Given these considerations, unit segregation cost (p in general should be a non-
increasing function of conventional soybean supply Y% : 
(3.14) p = /(0, /'(-)<=0 
For the purposes of the present model, however, given that there is little factual 
information on the extent of the economies scale and their relationship with the share of 
nonbiotech soybean supply in the total soybean production, it is assumed that the segregation 
technology is described by a constant cost function: 
f constant, p> 0 
(3
'
,5) Ho, P=0 
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In what follows, we will consider segregation costs only to the extent they arise 
between the moment a farmer sells his crop to the elevator and the moment soybeans reach 
the domestic user or are prepared to be shipped to the final consumer or crusher overseas. In 
other words, (p represents a wedge between the producer and home consumer price or, if the 
product is not consumed at home, the importing region's consumer price minus 
transportation costs. 
Assuming that segregation or identity preservation costs are borne entirely by the 
users of conventional technology, the profit functions per hectare in each region consistent 
with the parametric specifications in (3.7), (3.8) are defined as follows: 
(3.16) 7c° = A + y—— (p°H  -  <pfn  -  dw for conventional technology, 
(3.17) 7T ]  =A + a+ ^  +  (p\) ] + n  -  <5w(l + p) for RR technology, 
I + 77 
where p\ is the market price (at the demand level) of conventional soybeans and p\ is the 
market price of RR soybeans, so that the farmer (producer) price in the conventional soybean 
market is  p\-<p. 
Whereas in Chapter 3.1 we assumed that the adoption rate p is determined 
exogenously, here the relationship between tt° and TTx determines which technology is 
adopted by farmers. Because no heterogeneity among farmers is allowed in the model, the 
equilibrium in which both soybean varieties are produced requires that farmers are indifferent 
between the two technologies, i.e., /z-0 =%-'. Theoretically, this is guaranteed by the implicit 
optimal choice of //, the markup charged by the monopolist selling the RR seed that appears 
in the definition of The problem of this monopolistic seed producer is to maximize his 
overall profit in all countries where RR seed is sold, subject to farmers' incentive 
compatibility constraint Kx >/t° in each country. As pointed out in Moschini, Lapan and 
Sobolevsky (2000), this optimization problem must incorporate equilibrium in other markets, 
in particular the soybean market, such that JJ. = /i(/?^,,/?g ,,r,,...), where / denotes regions 
and r is the vector of other than seed input prices. As explained earlier, the equilibrium in the 
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soybean market with both varieties produced rules out a non-binding incentive compatibility 
constraint. 
In what follows we again do not solve for the optimal choice of the monopolist and 
the model relies instead on observed behavior for the parameter p that measures the markup 
on RR seed prices. Definitions (3.16) and (3.17) imply that yield functions are 
y° = G(pl -q>y for the conventional technology and y =(1 + f3)G(p\)n for the RR 
technology. Total supply of land to the soybean industry in each region is written in 
constant-elasticity form (3.11) as a function of average land rents, but now: 
(3.18) 7t=-
x\ p = 0 
(1 - p)7T° + pnX =7U* =7t\ p € (0,1) 
71 p = 1 
The region's adoption rate p or, equivalently, the land allocation between 
conventional and RR soybeans is endogenously determined in equilibrium. Endogenizing 
inter-variety land allocation represents a major difference in modeling supply relative to 
Moschini, Lapan and Sobolevsky (2000). 
Given the definition of p , RR and conventional soybeans will have pL and (1 - p)L 
hectars of land allocated to them, respectively, and since soybean supply is the product of 
allocated land and yield, the aggregate supply of each soybean variety in each region can be 
written in equilibrium due to (3.18) as: 
(3.19) 
(3.20) YX„=À 
A+- (pi  -çy+ n  -Svv 
l  + TJ 
(i-f)G(X-er 
A + a + G(^f>(p'By"' -Ml + p) p(l + «G(ri) 1 
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3.3. U.S. Price Support Policies 
The above supply equations were obtained under the assumption of no government 
intervention in the soybean sector. In reality, there exists a large number of countries in the 
world that pursue high price support policies to encourage agricultural production, with some 
of them simultaneously offering export subsidies to expand exports (Murphy, Furtan, and 
Schmitz, 1993). A question that arises in the context of the present model, then, concerns the 
effect that such price distortions have on the benefit that the world and individuals regions 
derive from biotechnology innovations resulting in technological change. As the following 
review of the literature shows, the adverse effects of price distortions can be quite high and 
even lead to immiserizing growth, with their actual size being an empirical question. 
With rare exceptions, the early research on benefits of R&D used closed models or 
trade models where agricultural price supports were absent, and reported impressive returns 
to R&D. A number of more recent articles, summarized and generalized in Alston and 
Martin (1995), explain how price-distorting policies may affect the size and distribution of 
returns to research, while Murphy, Furtan, and Schmitz (1993) even demonstrate the 
possibility of immiserizing technical change. In fact, the latter finding is not very new, as 
Johnson (1967) and Bhagwati (1968) have demonstrated a long time ago that growth may be 
welfare-reducing due to various trade policy distortions and terms-of-trade effects caused by 
market power in trade. For example, when domestic producers in the large exporting country 
enjoy a fixed price support, the research-induced supply shift, no matter parallel or pivotal,5 
has a range of implications. The welfare-reducing implications are the leftward shift in the 
rest of the world's excess demand due to the spillover of new technology overseas and the 
increase in export subsidy bill at home caused by higher exports and lower world price. The 
welfare-enhancing implications are the increase in producer and consumer surplus at home 
and overseas.6 Murphy, Furtan, and Schmitz (1993) show that taking most of these effects 
5 Whether the supply shift is parallel or pivotal matters for the producer surplus in home country. Alston and 
Martin (1995) show that with inelastic demand pivotal supply shift always makes producers worse off, while 
with parallel shift they are necessarily better off. In the present model, because of nonlinearities the supply shift 
may be seen as a mixture of a parallel shift and a pivot. 
6 Producers overseas will be hurt by lower world price but gain from the technology spillover, so that the net 
effect on them is ambiguous. 
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into account - they assume domestic consumers are locked into high support price and omit 
any rents arising from patenting the new technology - makes it theoretically possible for a 
technical change to have a negative ex post (i.e., without accounting for R&D expenditures) 
welfare impact not only for the exporting country undergoing technological growth but the 
world at large. Alston and Martin (1995) confirm with their more general model that 
technical change can lead to a loss or gain in welfare depending on whether it worsens an 
existing distortion to the extent that the increase in social costs of the distortion is greater 
than the maximum potential benefit of the technical change. 
Given such importance of price distortions for welfare analysis, we will explicitly 
model them in the region where they appear to be most apparent and relevant - the United 
States. The United States soybean farmers benefit from the Federal Agriculture 
Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, which established that nonrecourse marketing 
assistance loans and loan deficiency payments (LDPs) will be administered for the 1996 
through 2002 crops (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1998). Farmers may choose one of the 
two support options: a loan or an LDP. A loan pays a fixed dollar amount per bushel of 
soybeans, uses harvested crop as collateral and has a maturity period of nine months. A 
national average loan rate is fixed at the beginning of the crop year. For soybeans, it is 
established at the level of 85% of the simple average price received by producers during the 
marketing years for the immediately preceding 5 crops, excluding the highest and lowest 
prices, but no less than $4.92 per bushel ($180.76 per metric ton) and no more than $5.26 per 
bushel ($193.25 per metric ton). The USD A tracks current market prices using so called 
posted county prices (PCPs). The loan plus accrued interest may be repaid in full any time 
before maturity when PCP is higher than that combined amount. If PCP is lower than the 
loan rate plus interest, the loan is repaid by paying just PCP, with producers realizing a 
"marketing loan gain." Finally, the farmer may simply wait until maturity and forfeit the 
collateral crop to the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), the issuer of the loan. When a 
farmer decides to receive an LDP, he gets the difference between his county's loan rate and 
PCP if the latter is lower at the requested date. Thus, price support programs give farmers 
the following options: 
• sell the crop for cash and take an LDP; 
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• take an LDP, store the crop, and lock in a futures price; 
• take a loan, wait for favorable market conditions, sell the crop and repay the loan; 
• take a loan, then realize a marketing loan gain by repaying it at lower PCP; 
• take a loan and deliver the collateral crop to the CCC at maturity. 
Note that since the fifth option is likely to require a prior sale of the crop at the price 
close to PCP, and the third option seems rather unlikely (Hayes and Babcock, 1998), the 
opportunities to receive a price greater than the loan rate are presented only in the second and 
forth options. In what follows, the second option is assumed away for simplicity. 
Figure 3.1 offers a glimpse at the extent of the impact this price support program has 
had on U.S. soybean farmers in recent years. Whereas the 1996 and 1997 soybean crops did 
not benefit from LDPs, the soybean prices got as low as $150/MT in the following years, 
well below the national average loan rate of S193/MT that remained fixed at that level until 
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Figure 3.1. U.S. Soybean Prices and Price Support Rates, 1996-2002 ($/MT) 
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2002. Only in the summer of2002 did the soybean prices start to recover and they exceeded 
the loan rate in July for the first time in four years. But during that four-year period LDPs 
played a significant role in the U.S. soybean industry and can continue to do so if prices 
decline again. As the analysis in Chapter 5 suggests, U.S. farmers took full advantage of 
LDPs as soon as they became available during the 1998-1999 crop year. Disregarding this 
policy in the present model would therefore be a gross mistake. 
The implications of the price support programs for unit profit and supply functions of 
U.S. farmers are straightforward. Denoting by pWI, the average price offered by price 
support programs and assuming that these programs treat conventional and RR soybean 
growers uniformly (i.e., pay the same price for conventional and RR soybeans), supply 
equations (3.19) and (3.20) for the United States may be rewritten as 
(3.21) yZ=A 
(322) 
A+-^-(p°By+* -sw 
1 + 77 
A + a + Ç2+A(/ )'+, _ Sw(\ + ft) 
I + 77 
f(i+#co,;,r, 
where p\ =max{pW P ,p°B  -<p) and p\ =max{^,^}. 
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CHAPTER 4. TRADE AND MARKET EQUILIBRIUM 
As explained in Chapter 1, the world economy in this model is divided into four 
regions: the United Stated (subscripted U), Brazil (subscripted Z, includes Brazil and 
Paraguay), Argentina (subscripted A, includes all other countries of South America), and the 
Rest of the World (subscripted R, abbreviated ROW). Such regional division of the world 
allows the model to specifically describe individual economic characteristics of the main 
players in the soybean complex and emphasize the existing differences among them. It 
allows learning whether different regions are affected differently by the RR technology. In 
addition, it allows us to model possible future region-specific policy actions and estimate 
their economic impact on each region separately. 
In the model, trade takes place at all levels of the soybeans complex: in soybeans 
(subscripted B), soybean oil (subscripted O), and soybean meal (subscripted M). Any region 
can be involved in trading any product of any variety, and there are no a priori restrictions on 
the direction of trade. The spatial relationship among prices in different regions is 
established using constant price differentials defined for each pair of regions in each product, 
each variety and in each possible direction of trade flow. These spatial price differentials 
essentially represent transportation costs, but may also incorporate the effects of the existing 
import policies. 
4.1. Equilibrium Conditions 
I assume that crushing one unit of soybeans produces ya  units of oil and yM  units of 
meal, and that unit crushing costs (crushing margins) are constant and equal to mi (where the 
subscript i indexes the region). Then, the spatial market equilibrium conditions for the three-
good, four-region model outlined in chapters 2 and 3 areas follows: 
(4.i) £e»,o>l,/>L)+— 2X ,(âx . /)= 2X ,o> i , ,a ) 
i=U.A.7..R Yo i=U.A,Z,R i=U,A.7..R 
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(4.2) &APIj,AJ)+—0,APIJ-POj) = W,.,,Pi) ,  iz?^{U,A,Z,R} 
7o 
(4.3) 2e;.i(A.ri„)+— ZeLte°,,pk,)= Ey«,(ri.»A) 
7o i=U.A,Z.R i=ll,A,Z.R i=V.A,Z.R 
(4.4) 8i,(A,ri,)+—0,,«„ri,)=<,(ri.,-A), <€/•<={{/,4Z,*> 
7o 
(4.5) — EeLoCri,)* £aLo4„ri,) 
i=f/,^,Z,/î Xo \i=O^A,Z,R i=U.A%Z,R 
(4.6) yeru7\;:c{[/^,Z^}\r 
(4.7) p\ , +171,= YMPMJ + ToPo,i > Î e /' u /3, /3 c {CM,Z,£} \ /' 
X* (PIJ ) = (PBJ ) i f  Pi e (0,1) 
(4.8) ^^)>^(fL) A=0 7 = [/^,Z,^ 
^  P , =  1  
(4.9) 
(4.10) 
n° n° 
PBJ PBJ 
PBJ PBJ 
^ t0B.,j > V =  ^ Z, j?, i  
<t l B i ] , i , j=U,A, Z,  R,  i*j  
(4.11) |^, - ^, 4/ = 2: z 
(4.12) p\Ki - p]O J < tx0 ij, ij = U, A, Z, R, i  #j  
(4.13) PM J PM, ^tM J j , i , j  = U,A,Z,R,i*j  
Equations (4.1) and (4.3) are market clearing equations requiring that the total world 
soybean demand for direct use and processing equals world supply in each variety. 
Equations (4.2) and (4.4) specify market clearing conditions in conventional and RR markets 
of regions that do not trade in conventional or RR soybeans and oil in equilibrium, if such 
regions exist. These non-trading regions' indices are stored in f and I1, the subsets of the 
index set {U, A, Z, R}. Of course, it is possible that F is an empty set Also, given (4.1), the 
number of elements in f should not exceed 3. The same applies to I1. Equation (4.5) 
ensures that the soybean equivalents of oil and meal demands are the same on aggregate. 
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Equations (4.6) and (4.7) ensure that soybean processors of either variety receive a 
constant crushing margin mt, i=U, A, Z, R, to cover their costs (m, is the exogenous 
parameter determined at the calibration stage). Due to the existence of spatial price linkages 
among trading regions, each of these equations should be applied only to a single trading 
partner and any non-trading regions if such exist. For equation (4.6) this means that it must 
be imposed in every region whose index is stored in f and /, where I2 is the set containing a 
single index of any of the regions trading in the conventional variety. Similarly, equation 
(4.7) applies in regions with indices from I1 and Is, where I3 is the set containing a single 
index of any of the regions trading in the RR variety. 
Equation (4.8) describes the incentive compatibility constraints that must be satisfied 
in each region in equilibrium. Production of both conventional and RR soybeans takes place 
only when the respective unit profits are the same, i.e., when farmers are indifferent about 
which variety to produce. Otherwise, they produce only the more profitable variety. 
Equations (4.9) through (4.13) define the spatial configuration of prices. Because 
differentiated markets for biotech and nonbiotech soybean products are not well developed at 
present, various assumptions can be made with respect to possible configuration of trade 
flows, which warrants the most general specification. However, the four-region spatial 
model is restricted to have a maximum of three trade flows in each product variety. In the 
case of the soybean complex and the chosen regional division of the world there are three 
trade flows that are most likely to prevail in any conceivable equilibrium. Currently, the 
trade takes place between the United States and the Rest of the World, between Brazil and 
the Rest of the World, and between Argentina and the Rest of the World, but whether this is 
the case in differentiated markets will be determined by equilibrium. tkm tj denote price 
differentials (transportation costs) that are assumed symmetric for each pair of regions.7 
Whenever trade between two regions in a particular product variety exists, the corresponding 
inequality becomes the equality; otherwise the inequality must be strict. An assumption 
about direction of trade is necessary to replace absolute values by an appropriate sign. 
7 See Chapter 5 on calibration and Table 52 for more information on price differentials. 
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The existence and uniqueness of equilibrium is guaranteed by the normal shape of 
demand and supply curves as defined in Chapters 2 and 3 (Samuelson, 1952). It must be 
realized, however, that the uniqueness property is subject to the continuity of the segregation 
cost function (3.15). The general positive-constant-cost specification of (3.15) becomes 
ambiguous at a corner solution, i.e., it may be difficult to justify a constant non-zero 
segregation cost in a region that fully specializes in growing conventional soybeans. The 
rationale for having a non-zero segregation cost in such region must be a risk of losing its 
full-specialization status, thus requiring continued testing and other procedures, which still 
does not justify the imposition of the cost that would be reasonable, for example, at a 20% 
adoption rate. In what follows, it is assumed - without any loss of generality - that a region 
producing only conventional soybeans pays no segregation cost. 
I now assume that the soybean and soybean oil demands in the Rest of the World are 
the only differentiated demands in the system, while the U.S., Argentine and Brazilian 
consumers remain indifferent as to what variety of soybeans, oil or meal they consume. In a 
nontrivial differentiated equilibrium with no production or import bans (i.e., the one in which 
both varieties are produced and consumed) we can then define the demands that appeared in 
(4.1)-(4.13) more explicitly, in line with definitions of Chapter 2: 
(4.14) z=C/,4Z 
Qoj (PO, i  ' PO, i  ) = Qoj (PB,I )> Z = U,A,Z 
QM , (PM., ) = QM,I (PM ,), Î = u, A,Z,R 
Were we to assume that all four regions have differentiated demands in soybeans and 
soybean oil, only the last of the five identities in (4.14) would apply. 
A limitation of the equilibrium system (4.1)- (4.13) is that it does not allow one to 
recover individual trade flows for all goods, i.e., to provide separate values for 
exports/imports of soybeans, soybean oil and soybean meal. The reason for this ambiguity is 
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that, once a region has an excess supply of soybeans available for meeting an excess demand 
for oil and/or meal, these soybeans can be either crushed in the exporting region and exported 
in the form of oil and meal, or can be equivalently exported in the form of soybeans and 
crushed by the region-importer. This feature is ultimately due to the assumption of the 
constant-retums-to-scale crushing technology in all regions of the world, which makes the 
inter-regional distribution of crush undetermined in equilibrium. 
Consequently, the only meaningful trade flow result that can be reported in 
equilibrium is the factor content of trade in the form of the excess supply of soybeans (in 
each variety) remaining after subtracting domestic soybean demand and the soybean 
equivalent of domestic oil demand from the domestic supply of beans: 
(4.15) i  = U,A,Z,R; j  = 0,1 
Yo 
We can call ESJH i the soybean-equivalent net exports. However, this definition is not 
very precise because this "equivalence" measure does not capture all volume of trade 
between regions. The missing element is the residual excess supply of soybean meal arising 
because the soybeans that are crushed to meet domestic oil demand need not yield the 
amount of meal exactly equal to domestic meal demand: 
(4.16) £V,=—(05,+2i, i  = U,A,Z,R 
Yo 
ESM J is reported under the "Meal Exports" heading in the results tables available in 
the appendix. 
4.2. Solution Algorithm 
Given this setting, we are faced with the task of solving the spatial four-region three-
good equilibrium model. The literature on spatial equilibrium models can be traced back to 
Samuelson (1952), who showed that in the partial-equilibrium (one commodity) context the 
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problem of finding competitive equilibrium among spatially separated markets could be 
converted mathematically into a maximum problem. Defining the net social payoff function 
as the sum of areas under all regions' excess demand curves minus total transportation cost, 
Samuelson proved that maximization of this net welfare function, providing that all domestic 
supply curves cut demand curves from below as price rises, would result in a unique solution 
with prices and quantities that satisfied all properties of the spatial price equilibrium. He also 
suggested that this maximization problem could be solved by trial and error or by a 
systematic procedure of varying export shipments consistently in the direction of increasing 
social welfare. 
Samuelson's result not only made it easy to produce rigorous qualitative comparative 
statics predictions, but also showed how to actually solve some spatial equilibrium models in 
an era of limited computing resources. Takayama and Judge (1964,1970) extended 
Samuelson's work to a multiple-commodity competitive equilibrium case and demonstrated 
that the problem, under the assumption of linear aggregate regional demand and supply 
functions, can be converted to a conventional quadratic programming problem8 and solved 
using the available simplex methods. Takayama and Judge (1970,1971) also showed that 
their approach would work not only for linear demand specifications that satisfy symmetry 
conditions (the type of the demand system used in (2.1)), but also for spatial models with 
asymmetric demand coefficients, and that the model can still be solved using quadratic 
programming technique when competition is replaced by monopolistic behavior. 
Although the quadratic programming approach in the framework of linear market 
specification proved to be very efficient and hence very popular in economic research on 
agriculture, energy and minerals, the attempts to introduce nonlinear demand and supply 
specifications in the spatial equilibrium models were not as successful. Takayama and Labys 
(1986) pointed out that optimization-based solution algorithms with nonlinear demands and 
supplies were becoming extremely complicated and time consuming, imposing a 
computational burden that was just too high to justify nonlinear specifications. They provide 
an example of the Japan Ministry of Agriculture that started using the agricultural modeling 
8 The problem of maximizing the quadratic function subject to linear inequality constraints. 
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system with general nonlinear functions in 1970's but had to scrap it eventually due to its 
high costs. 
In the present model, the size of the spatial equilibrium system is not very large, and 
computer time at modern processing speeds is not a limiting factor. Nevertheless, due to 
nonlinearities in the model's supply specification, the existing quadratic programming 
algorithms cannot be applied, and no other ready algorithm is available. Therefore, the 
choice was made to solve the spatial equilibrium model defined earlier in this chapter 
directly, using available numerical techniques of solving the NxN systems of nonlinear 
equations. 
The model (4.1) - (4.13) is solved using GAUSS, the software equipped with eqSolve 
procedure that solves NxN systems of nonlinear equations by inverting the system's 
Jacobian while iterating until convergence. Needless to say, all equations must be binding. 
In our case, however, the number of binding equations in (4.1) - (4.13) is not determined a 
priori. There are two sources of ambiguity: the number of trade flows in each commodity 
and the possible specialization in production of a particular soybean variety in each region, 
which are discussed in detail in Appendix E. For example, when differentiated markets exist 
only in the Rest of the World, the size of the binding portion of (4.1) - (4.13) can be 
anywhere from N=5 to N=21. 
GAUSS provides no capability to change the dimensions of the system of equations 
as it is being solved. Thus, in the case when differentiated markets exists only in the Rest of 
the World, the solution algorithm looks for the equilibrium by repeatedly solving the 
fluctuating-in-size binding portion of the system (4.1) - (4.13) over all possible combinations 
of the following assumptions: 
• a region specializes in conventional soybeans, or in RR soybeans, or does not 
specialize - for each region; 
• there is no trade in RR beans/oil; 
• there is only one RR trade flow involving a pair of regions, in either direction, for all 
possible region pairs; 
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• there are two RR trade flows, in all possible combinations of directions, excluding 
(for arbitrage reasons) cases when the same region is both exporter and importer of 
the same product(s); 
• there are three RR trade flows, in all possible combinations of directions, excluding 
(for arbitrage reasons) cases when the same region is both exporter and importer of 
the same product(s). 
When each of the above scenarios is solved, the solution - if it exists - is checked 
against the remaining non-binding equations of the system (4.1) - (4.13). When a 
differentiated market equilibrium satisfying the system (4.1) - (4.13) is found, the model 
solves the benchmark pre-innovation undifferentiated equilibrium and computes consumer 
and producer surpluses, innovator-monopolist's profit, and subsidy to U.S. farmers. 
A more detailed discussion of the solution algorithm and its implementation is 
provided in Appendix E. 
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CHAPTERS. CALIBRATION 
The parameters of the model are calibrated such as to predict prices and quantities in 
the soybean complex for the crop year 1998-99, the most recent complete year when the 
analysis was undertaken. Production and utilization data are given in Tables 1.2- 1.4 in 
Chapter 1. The history of world adoption rates for RR soybeans is provided in Table 1.5 in 
Chapter 1, with adoption rates used in calibration shown in the last column of the table. 
Price data are in Table 5.1 below. U.S. prices for soybeans, oil and meal were taken to be 
Table 5.1. Prices in the Soybean Complex ($/MT) 
93-94" 94-95a 95-96' 96-97' 97-98" 98-99' 94-99 
(average) 
Soybeans 
US farm priceb 233 205 263 274 230 176 230 
US Gulf, f.o.b.b 248 226 288 293 247 193 249 
Argentina f.o.b.b 231 214 277 288 231 179 238 
Brazil f.o.b.b 235 217 284 285 240 184 242 
Rotterdam c.i.f.b 259 248 304 307 259 225 269 
Soybean meal 
US (Decatur), 44%bd 199 167 248 286 193 145 208 
Brazil, 44-45% f.o.b.M 182 172 256 289 201 150 214 
Argentina (pell.) f.o.b.b 174 151 233 257 174 130 189 
Rotterdam c.i.f. 202 184 256 278 197 150 213 
(Argentina 44-45%)c,d 
Rotterdam c.i.f. 211 194 266 293 212 161 225 
(Brazil 48%)c-d 
Soybean oil 
US (Decatur)0 596 605 550 504 571 441 534 
US (Decatur)15 595 606 545 496 569 438 531 
US Gulf, f.o.b.c 643 569 527 622 471 566 
Brazil, f.o.b.c 546 629 540 518 618 456 552 
Brazil, f.o.b.® 539 608 537 514 608 452 544 
Argentina, f.o.b.c 545 625 540 517 617 456 551 
Argentina, f.o.b.® 543 623 533 515 614 453 548 
Rotterdam, f.o.b.0 580 642 575 536 633 483 574 
8 Fiscal years (October to September) 
b Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture 
c Source: Oil World (2000) 
d Percentage refers to protein content 
c Source: Safras and Mercad 
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equal $176, $441 and $145 per MT, respectively. In the United States, the producer (farmer) 
price for soybeans was different from $176/MT due to LDPs; see Chapter 5.4 below. 
Because world trade patterns in 1998-99 have not changed compared to the preceding crop 
year, with the United States, Argentina and Brazil being net exporters and the Rest of the 
World being a net importer of soybeans and all soybean products, the spatial price 
differentials were taken at the levels used in Moschini, Lapan and Sobolevsky (2000, p.46) 
who analyzed the issue for 1997-98. Argentine and Brazilian differentials are set equal to 
those of South America in Moschini, Lapan and Sobolevsky (2000) because both regions' 
f.o.b. prices for soybeans and soybean products are very close to each other (see Table 5.1). 
Separately, the recent USDA report on agriculture in Brazil and Argentina (Schneph, 
Dohlman and Boiling, 2001) supported the $30/MT soybean transportation cost estimate 
between the United States and the rest of the World and at least a $10/MT U.S. transportation 
cost advantage over Argentina and Brazil due to distance and higher insurance costs. See 
Table 5.2 for individual transportation cost values. 
5.1. Demand 
The assumption is that, in a region with heterogeneous preferences with respect to 
biotech and nonbiotech crops, soybean demand will be differentiated. As far as soybean oil 
Table 5.2. Transportation Costs ($/MT) 
k=0,l m = B m = 0 m = M 
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Note: tkm y denotes transportation cost between regions / and j for variety k of product m. 
B, O, M stand for beans, oil and meal; R, U, A, Z stand for ROW, U.S., Argentina, and Brazil 
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is concerned, detection of GMOs in it depends on the degree of its refinement Still, some 
concerned food manufacturers, such as baby food and EU producers have recently expressed 
their intention to voluntarily procure GM-free ingredients in order to avoid their customers' 
concerns, retain their market shares and avoid biotech labeling requirements (Lin, Chambers 
and Harwood, 2000). In view of that evidence soybean oil is also modeled as a differentiated 
product in those regions where differentiation takes place. The current situation with 
soybean meal is the one where countries have no legislation concerning genetically modified 
animal feed, and biotech soybean meal is widely used by animal stock producers all over the 
world, including Japan, which represents the largest niche market for nonbiotech soybeans at 
present. However, feed labeling legislation is being drafted at least in the EU and can be 
imposed in the near future. For the time being, demand for meal is not differentiated and is 
calibrated accordingly. 
In order to solve for the five parameters of the differentiated demand system (either 
for soybeans or oil), we need to specify five relationships involving these parameters. As no 
mass segregation of KR and conventional soybeans has taken place in the 1998-99 reference 
year, we can assume, as discussed in Chapter 2, that in that year 0° =0 and 
Ql =a, + cp° -b)p]. Hence, for the observed total quantity demanded Q and price p, it 
must be that: 
(5.1) Ô = a,+^-
Now, consider the case when p° falls from the choke level p° so that p° = px  = p. 
First, we can assume that the fraction of the total demand that is "indifferent" at these prices 
is â g (0,1), to obtain: 
(5.2) -(b' ^  r = â (a0 +a l)-(b0 +bx  - 2c)p 
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Secondly, the total demand can be assumed to have increased due to this price 
reduction by a factor of k with respect to the total demand at prices p°,p in the reference 
year: 
(5.3) aQ +a,-(60 + b}-2c)p = kÔ, £>1. 
Finally, let's bring elasticity assumptions to bear. In the reference year, the observed 
own price demand elasticity at price p is: 
(5.4) sau =-
». )Q 
Also, assume that the own-price conventional demand elasticity at p = p = p is 
s00: 
(5.5) £°°=-b{  
a0-(b0-c)p 
The solution of the system (5.1)-(5.5) and the resulting restrictions on the parameters 
of the demand system are discussed in Appendix B. 
Undifferentiated demand's parameters are calibrated as follows: 
(5.6) g = 6(1-2"'), 6 = 
The following values of parameters were chosen for both beans and oil: â = 0.5, 
£ = 1.05, and s00 = -4.5 (see Appendix B for more explanation). sua = -0.4 in all regions 
and for all products (Moschini, Lapan and Sobolevsky, 2000, p. 45-46). 
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5.2. Supply 
All supply function parameters, unless explicitly discussed in this section, are 
assigned their values according to the findings and assumptions of Moschini, Lapan and 
Sobolevsky (2000), with Brazil and Argentina assigned the South American values. 
Calibrated parameters are obtained using specifications (3.7) - (3.13). 
In line with Moschini, Lapan and Sobolevsky (2000), the unit seed cost Sco is set at 
{45,40,40,40}*. The $45/ha U.S. cost comes from Table 5.3. In Argentina (see Table 5.4), 
conventional soybean seeds sold for $8-10/bag in 1998. In per-hectar terms, it's at most $30 
Table 5.3. Estimated Costs of Soybean Production in Iowa, 2000 ($/acre, Conventional 
Tillage, Soybeans Following Corn, Assuming 45 bu/acre Yield). 
Conventional RR' RRb 
Pre-harvest machinery 22.06 22.06 22.06 
Seed" 18.00 18.00 18.00 
Technology feed - 7.20 7.20 
Herbicide 25.97 15.38 10.21 
Fertilizer and other intermed. inputs 35.75 35.75 35.75 
Interest 5.43 5.22 4.89 
Harvest machinery 20.30 20.30 20.30 
Labor 18.99 18.99 18.99 
Land 120.00 120.00 120.00 
Total 266.50 262.90 257.40 
RR cost reduction $/acre 3.60 9.10 
$/hectar 8.90 22.49 
Source: Author's adaptation of Iowa State University Extension budgets (ISU Weed Science for herbicide costs; 
Duffy and Smith (2000) for the rest). 
a Based on herbicide treatment consisting of 48 oz/acre of Roundup Ultra and 5 lbs/acre of ammonium sulphate. 
b Based on herbicide treatment consisting of 32 oz/acre of Roundup Ultra and 3 lbs/acre of ammonium sulphate, 
with no adjustment for labor and preharvest machinery costs to reflect the savings of reduced treatment. 
c $15.00 per 50 lb bag. Conventional tillage requires 1.2 bags/acre. 
d $6.00 per 50 lb bag (average, due to various promotions/discounts). 
9 Here and elsewhere in the text the elements of the four-dimensional vectors refer to the United States, Brazil, 
Argentina, and the Rest of the World, respectively. 
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Table 5.4. Soybean Seed Prices per 50 lb Bag, Before Taxes8,1998 
Conventional Seeds Roundup Ready Seeds 
United States $13-17 $20-23" 
Argentina $8-10 $12-15 
Source: U.S. Government Accounting Office (2000) 
a No taxes on seed purchases are levied in Illinois and Iowa; Argetine fanners' net tax 
burden is about 12%. 
b Includes technology fee. 
before taxes or $36 after the 21% tax charged to farmers. On the other hand, Schneph, 
Dohlman and Boiling (2001) provide a $44/ha estimate for Argentina and a $41 /ha estimate 
for the Southern part of Brazil. Therefore, I set 8a = 40 in Argentina and Brazil and assume 
the same for the Rest of the World. 
RR seed monopolist's markup is set to // = {0.4,0.2,0.2.0.2}. The 0.4 U.S. 
estimate is the result of the $6 per bag technology fee charged by Monsanto (see Table 5.3). 
In Argentina, Monsanto does not charge an explicit technology fee and is limited to 
collecting the value of the RR technology via agreements with Argentine seed companies 
(U.S. Government Accounting Office, 2000). The situation is aggravated by the fact that a 
large share of seed is not purchased via commercial channels. From Table 5.5, one would 
conservatively assume that at least 50% of soybean seed planted in Argentina is not 
commercially purchased, implying that the average markup in Argentina is at best JJ. = 0.2. 
IPR protection will unlikely be better in Brazil or the Rest of the World, and therefore I set 
// = 0.2 in these two regions as well. 
The cost saving due to RR technology parameter AK has been revised to $15/ha for 
the United States. As Table 5.3 illustrates, following the introduction of competitively priced 
Roundup Ready weed control systems, the prices for competing herbicides, especially those 
used for conventional soybeans, have declined over the last two years in the U.S. For 2000, 
it is estimated that the cost saving of using RR technology lies between $8.90 and $22.49 per 
hectar and therefore I conservatively set it at $15. Because planting conditions and 
technologies in Brazil and Argentina are very close to those in the United States, as 
manifested by very similar soybean production yields, ATT is expected to be the same in 
these regions if RR pricing conditions were the same. Given that RR seed markup 
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Table 5.5. Sources of Soybean Seeds, 1998 
Source of Seeds Estimated Percentage of Total Soybean Acreage Planted 
United States Argentina 
Commercial Sales 80-85 28-50 
Farmer-saved 15-20 25-35 
Black Market Sales 0-2 25-50 
Source: U.S. Government Accounting Office (2000) 
coefficient is twice lower in Brazil and Argentina than in the United States, these two regions 
gain an additional $8/ha ( Sco =40 times the markup differential 0.2) for the total An =23, 
based on A# = A-ÔCÙJJ. (assuming /? = 0; see equation (3.9)). Because the ROW yield is 
only two-thirds of the yield in the other three regions, it is expected to gain proportionally at 
$10/ha under U.S. pricing conditions. And, because RR seed markup coefficient in the Rest 
of the World is twice lower than in the United States, the additional advantage of $8/ha 
results in the ATV =18. To summarize, AX = {15,23,23, 18} and the steps of its estimation 
are illustrated in Table 5.6. 
The elasticity of land supply with respect to soybean prices y/ remains 0.8 in the 
United States and 0.6 in the Rest of the World (Moschini, Lapan and Sobolevsky, 2000). 
The value of y=1.0 previously estimated for South America still applies to Brazil, but not to 
Argentina. Brazil has vast areas of undeveloped arable land in its Center-West and North 
regions that can serve and has served as engines of soybean production growth (Schneph, 
Dohlman and Boiling, 2001). In Argentina, much like in the United States, growth in 
soybean areas can be achieved only by substitution. Therefore, parameter y/ is set equally in 
the United States and Argentina and, overall, y/= {0.8,1.0,0.8,0.6}. 
Table 5.6. Estimation of Parameter ATC = a -  S c o j u .  
United States Brazil Argentina ROW 
A it subject to jj. = {0.4,0.4,0.4, 0.4} 15 15 15 10 
A/i differential with the United States 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
Sco seed cost 45 40 40 40 
A7i final estimate 15 23 23 18 
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The technical coefficients y M and yQ are set to their world average values for the 
1998-99 crop year, that is yM =0.7985 and yQ =0.1810. 
5.3. Segregation Costs 
Lin, Chambers and Harwood (2000) extended the segregation cost estimates available 
for specialty crops grown in the United States in 1998 (Bender et al, 1999) to nonbiotech 
soybeans and projected that for U.S. grain handlers segregating nonbiotech soybeans may 
cost from $6.60 to S19.80/MT, depending on whether handling process patterns that used for 
HOC (high oil corn) or the one used for STS soybeans.10 Bullock and Desquilbet (2002) 
provide an observable segregation cost estimate of $11,00/MT based on the Japanese GMO-
free soybean importer premiums and premiums to farmers shipping nonbiotech soybeans to 
elevators near Illinois River. These estimates refer only to grain handlers' costs, covering 
country elevators, subterminals and export elevators. Possible farm-level and additional 
handling and transportation costs beyond export elevators are not taken into account in these 
estimates, which is consistent with our definition of (p. To study the effects of segregation 
costs in the given range, the model is solved with the following alternative segregation costs 
set equally in all regions (in addition to ç = {0,0,0,0}): cp = {6.6,6.6,6.6,6.6}, {13.2, 
13.2,13.2,13.2}, and {19.8,19.8,19.8,19.8}. These cost levels will be often referred to as 
low, medium, and high. 
5.4. Marketing Assistance Loans and Loan Deficiency Payments in the United States 
In 1998-99, consumer and producer soybean prices were not the same in the United 
States. The actual price support activity in the U.S. soybean sector is presented in Table 5.7. 
While in 1997-98 crop year only 10% of soybean production enjoyed price support, in 1998-
10 This does not contradict some earlier estimates produced by European studies, where elevator premiums 
necessary to cover IP costs for value-added GM soybeans are estimated for the United States at $1.80 -
$3.70ZMT, crusher premiums are expected in the same range, and refiner-level premiums are at $4.40 -
$8.80/MT. 
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Table 5.7. Loan Deficiency Payments and Price Support Loan Activity, 1997-1999 
LDPb Loan Activity" 
Year3 Loan Rate 
$/MT 
Total Total 
Quantity Payment 
Quantity 
under Loan 
Repayment Mkt Gain Mkt Gain 
Quantity Quantity Amount 
1997 
1998 
1999 
193.25 
193.25 
193.25 
0.00 0.0 
58.04 883.5 
63.09 2,106.6 
7.20 
9.19 
7.78 
7.02 1.44 15.8 
8.81 8.63 338.2 
4.29 4.26 110.7 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture (2000b). 
3 Crop year: September - August 
b Quantities in million MT, payments/amounts — in million dollars 
1999 support covered 90% of the crop, of which 78 percentage points received LDPs, 0.5 
percentage points was delivered to the CCC on loan's maturity and 11.5 percentage points 
used to realize marketing loan gains. The share of the aforementioned option four (Chapter 
3.3, page 30) was negligible. This means that approximately 90% of the 1998 U.S. soybean 
crop was sold by farmers at the loan rate of $193/MT and not at the average 1998-99 U.S. 
farm price of $176/MT. A similar situation emerged in 1999, when U.S. soybean production 
reached 71.9 million MT and about 98% of it relied on government price support. 
Therefore, assuming that all farmers make rational economic decisions, the average 
U.S. producer price is set at $193/MT in 1998-99, and in scenarios in which the U.S. price 
support program is assumed to remain in force it is assumed that p!DP =193 given that the 
average national loan rate in 2000 and 2001 remained at $193.25. 
5.5. Calibration Summary 
The summary of all parameters and their values used for model calibration purposes 
and for solving the world soybean complex partial equilibrium defined by equations (4.1) -
(4.14) is provided in Table 5.8. Some parameter values are borrowed from Moschini, Lapan 
and Sobolevsky (2000) who estimated them for a simpler soybean complex model with no 
differentiated markets and no segregated supply lines. These parameter values are believed 
to apply in the current model because there was either no additional data found to challenge 
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them or the additional data confirmed their validity. Other parameter values were amended 
as discussed earlier in this chapter, and several new parameters were added. 
Table 5.8. Model's Parameters and Their Values. 
Parameter Description Values U.S. Brazil Argentina ROW 
eB Own price non-segregated bean demand elasticity -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 
~uv eo Own price non-segregated oil demand elasticity -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 
•uu SM Own price non-segregated meal demand elasticity -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 
êf Own price conventional bean demand elasticity -4.5 
$ Own price conventional oil demand elasticity3 -4.5 
4 Total bean demand increase due to price decrease3 1.05 
ko Total oil demand increase due to price decrease3 1.05 
Share of "indifferent" bean demand in total3 0.5 
Share of "indifferent" oil demand in total3 0.5 
¥ Elasticity of land supply w.r.t. soybean price 0.8 1.0 0.8 0.6 
7 Elasticity of yield w.r.t. soybean price 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Sa Unit seed cost 45.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 
&7Z Producer unit profit change due to RR technology 15.0 23.0 23.0 18.0 
r Producer rent share in average profit 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
M Innovator-monopolist markup on RR seed price 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 
P Coefficient of yield increase due to RR technology 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
PWP Soybean farmer LDP/loan price 193.0 
<P Segregation cost per MT 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 
13.2 13.2 13.2 13.2 
19.8 19.8 19.8 19.8 
' See Chapter 5.1 for details. 
50 
CHAPTER 6. RESULTS 
The model described by equations (4.1) - (4.14) was solved numerically using Gauss 
software for several parameter values and policy scenarios. As stipulated by equation (4.14), 
only the Rest of the World is assumed to have consumers with differentiated tastes for 
soybeans and soybean oil. Consumers in the United States, Argentina and Brazil do not 
differentiate between conventional and RR soybean products and consume the variety that is 
cheaper in equilibrium. 
Several scenarios are of interest in this setting. First, I study the implications of 
introducing the RR technology in the soybean complex that is free of any government 
intervention. Regional adoption rates, prices, production and consumption patterns, trade 
flows and welfare associated with this equilibrium are discussed in Chapter 6.1 (Scenario 1). 
Scenario 2 looks at how regions are affected if the United States were to pursue a domestic 
price support policy to help its farmers in the form of LDPs and market loans. As explained 
in Chapter 3.3, this scenario is important because the Unites States has a history of providing 
sizable price support to its soybean producers. Such price distortions can in theory lead to 
immiserizing growth and deserve due attention in research. 
Scenario 3 is the first in the series of government ban scenarios considered next. It 
simulates the situation in which the Rest of the World introduces a ban on RR soybean 
production at home. The Rest of the World region includes the countries of European Union, 
Japan and several others that have already adopted regulations prohibiting production of 
unapproved biotech crops that led to a de facto ban on all biotech production in the region. 
Scenario 4 looks at the same production ban but in Brazil. To date, Brazil has not adopted 
RR soybeans despite their wide popularity in the neighboring Argentina and is seen as trying 
to differentiate itself from other soybean exporting nations by establishing itself as a biotech-
free soybean region. Next two scenarios are variations on the same theme. Scenario 5 
investigates the effects of simultaneous RR production bans in Brazil and the Rest of the 
World, and Scenario 6 adds an import ban on RR products in the Rest of the World in 
addition to production bans. Finally, in Chapter 6.71 discuss a separate question of 
economic benefits of RR technology under alternative market structures. Changes in market 
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structure are realized by changing the behavior of the innovator-monopolist that sells RR 
seed. 
All aforementioned scenarios except for the last one are solved for four distinct levels 
of segregation costs in order to provide initial sensitivity assessment of results with respect to 
this variable. In addition, I obtain a solution for the full adoption scenario (p=\, i = U, A, 
Z, R) that arises when no segregation technology is available yet, so that no soybeans can be 
guaranteed to be GMO-free and the differentiated demand for conventional product varieties 
is driven to zero by prohibitively high ("choke") prices. The regional demand functions for 
this scenario are defined in (2.6) and (2.9), and supply functions satisfy (3.11). The 
benchmark for all welfare calculations is the pre-innovation scenario in which the RR 
soybean is not yet available ( pi =0, i = U, A, Z, R), such that demands are described by 
equations (2.4) and (2.9), while supplies are described by (3.11). In each of these two special 
scenarios with only one soybean variety produced and consumed in equilibrium, the 
equilibrium trade and market conditions are still described by (4.1)-(4.14) with some of the 
equations collapsed into trivial identities. 
Consumer and producer surplus and the innovator-monopolist profit are computed 
and reported in all regions. Specifically, if p°ti is the equilibrium undifferentiated pre-
innovation price for product j in region z, and p°and , are equilibrium prices of 
conventional and RR varieties in the differentiated market, then, setting the reservation price 
Pjj = p°jj, the change in consumer surplus is defined as follows (Just, Hueth and Schmitz, 
Consumer surplus changes in undifferentiated markets are computed in the standard 
way: 
1982): 
(6.1) ACSy, = - \Q))(]>°u,p'u)dp)J - l&APu.PuWu 
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Now, let Kj be the pre-innovation equilibrium average unit profit that satisfies (3.10), 
and ni be the differentiated market equilibrium average unit profit that satisfies (3.18). Then 
the change in producer surplus between pre-innovation and differentiated market scenarios 
is: 
(6.3) APS, = ]L,(v)dv 
where L, is the land allocation function (3.11). The innovator-monopolist's profit is 
computed simply as 
(6.4) n" = 
,=U.S,R 
where p i  is the equilibrium rate of adoption in region /. The total change in welfare is 
defined as: 
A Wu = A CSjjj + APSV +UM 
(6 5) j=n.oM 
y 
' ' AW, = ^ ACS j j +APS i  i = A,Z,R 
j=B,OM 
There is one important result that is common to all scenarios that will be discussed in 
the subsequent sections of this chapter. That is, the direction of trade flows, when flows are 
nonzero, does not change in any equilibrium from what is observed in the pre-innovation 
market. Trade in all products and in all varieties flows from the United States, Argentina and 
Brazil to the Rest of the World except for some instances when particular regions find 
themselves in autarky in a particular product variety. These exceptions will be noted 
explicitly. All results are shown in tables in Appendix C. 
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6.1. Scenario 1: No LDPs11 in the United States 
Absent any government intervention, the soybean complex is subject to the only 
market distortion that comes from the U.S.-based monopolist selling RR seed to all regions. 
I find a unique equilibrium solution for this scenario for each of the four selected levels of 
segregation costs. Equilibrium adoption rates, consumer, producer, monopolist's and total 
welfare changes, as well as production and trade flow results are provided in Table CI of 
Appendix C. Equilibrium price and consumption data for soybeans and soybean oil of both 
varieties, as well as soybean meal, are provided in Table C2. 
As the world moves to the full adoption of the cost-saving RR technology, U.S. 
soybean prices fall by 4%, oil - by 7%, and meal -by 1%, and prices in all other regions 
decline as well, as shown in the "No segregation technology" set of results in Table CI. U.S. 
soybean supply falls because the region's new technology cost savings are the smallest 
among the four regions due to the enforcement oflPRs and are not high enough to offset the 
price decline, but other regions' supply grows. Consumption increases in all regions but the 
Rest of the World, where GMO-conscious consumers cut down on the consumption of 
inferior RR soybeans and soybean oil. Each region and the world in general benefit by 
moving to the complete adoption, with worldwide efficiency gain estimated at $1,564 
million. This is 25% lower than the worldwide gain estimated using the Moschini, Lapan 
and Sobolevsky (2000) soybean model with this dissertation's parametric assumptions. The 
lower welfare gain is explained by the negative value RR soybeans generate for the Rest of 
the World consumers who prefer the conventional variety. Consumers capture 39% of the 
welfare gain, while the innovator-monopolist - another 53%. Farmers in the United States 
lose for the same reason the region's supply decreases, while farmers in other regions gain. 
Note that consumers in the Rest of the World gain despite the baseline assumption that 50% 
of them would prefer the conventional soybean and soy oil variety if it were sold at prices 
equal to prices of non-segregated (blend) products in the reference year. Clearly, this is a net 
11 Here and elsewhere in the text the term "LDPs" is used to refer both to loan deficiency payments and market 
loans received by U.S. farmers. 
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effect of GMO-conscious consumers losing from prohibitively high prices for conventional 
products and GMO-indifferent consumers benefiting from lower prices. 
Depriving the Rest of the World consumers of exercising the choice to consume 
conventional products is clearly not the welfare-maximizing solution, as evidenced from the 
scenario with segregation costs set to S19.8/MT worldwide, or 11% of the price received by 
U.S. farmers growing conventional soybeans. However, the increase in welfare gain relative 
to the no-segregation scenario is only 1%. In other words, the costs of segregation "burn" 
most of the additional gain due to conventional product availability. 
The high-segregation-cost equilibrium, the likely first to emerge at the early stages of 
introduction of the new segregation technology, is very similar to the no-segregation-
technology one because the share of conventional soybeans is a mere 2% in worldwide 
production and 23% in total soybean demand in the ROW. The United States is the only 
region producing both varieties, while all other regions specialize in production of RR 
soybeans. The fact that the United States and not the ROW that has the GMO-conscious 
consumers produces conventional soybeans is explained by the relatively smaller cost 
savings in the United States associated with the RR technology that make U.S. farmers more 
easily attracted to growing nonbiotech soybeans. In equilibrium, the U.S. adoption rate for 
RR soybeans is 95%. Compared to the pre-innovation benchmark, RR prices fall, 
conventional producer prices fall, too, but conventional consumer prices increase due to 
segregation costs. 
Let's now trace the changes in equilibrium prices, quantities and welfare as 
segregation costs start to fall. The decline in these costs is shared between the conventional 
variety's consumers and producers thanks to the fact that demands are not completely 
inelastic. As illustrated by medium and low-segregation-cost scenarios in Table C2, 
conventional consumer prices fall and conventional producer prices increase as segregation 
costs decline. This benefits ROW consumers and U.S. producers who increase their share of 
conventional soybean production to 30% when segregation costs are low. The United States 
remains the only producer of the conventional variety, with the worldwide share of the 
conventional soybean market growing to 13%. As more production shifts toward 
conventional soybeans, the world's RR supply decreases causing RR prices to increase. 
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Therefore, producer surplus improves in all four regions and consumer surplus in the United 
States, Brazil and Argentina, where only RR products are consumed, reduces. 
In the zero-segregation-cost equilibrium, which is useful to analyze because it isolates 
the RR technology impacts from those caused by segregation costs, the share of the 
conventional soybean market reaches 17%. Brazil finds it profitable to grow conventional 
soybeans but allocates only 1% of total soybean land to them. The U.S. adoption rate is a 
low 62% and the region finds itself in an autarky equilibrium in the RR market, exporting 
only the conventional variety to the ROW. As a result, RR prices in the other regions fall 
compared to the low-segregation-cost scenario under the pressure of weakened RR import 
demand from the ROW. The high autarkic RR prices in the United States finally help U.S. 
farmers to benefit from the RR technology - the only simulated scenario when this happens. 
The seed monopolist, on the contrary, benefits the least in this scenario due to a large 
worldwide share of conventional soybean production and captures 38% of the total welfare 
gain. Notably, the monopolist's profit in general is positively correlated with the level of 
segregation costs as higher costs lead to higher RR adoption rates in equilibrium. This sets 
the monopolist at odds with the interests of both conventional and RR soybean producers 
who benefit from higher prices in lower-segregation-cost equilibria. 
6.2. Scenario 2: LDPs in the United States 
Assume now that U.S. farmers receive LDPs in the amount of $193/MT both in the 
counterfactual market equilibria and the pre-innovation benchmark (supply equations (3.21), 
(3.22) apply in this case). Results are shown in Tables C3 and C4 of Appendix C. The 
United States does not produce the conventional variety because LDPs equate farmer prices 
for conventional and RR soybeans and create a permanent incentive to specialize in the RR 
variety. Brazil emerges as the only producer and exporter of conventional products to the 
ROW in all three positive segregation cost cases, with the United States, Brazil and 
Argentina exporting RR products. In the zero-segregation-cost scenario Brazil allocates a 
high 49% of its soybean land to the conventional variety and does not export RR beans and 
oil. Argentina, too, dedicates 50% of its total production to conventional soybeans when 
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segregation costs are zero. As in Scenario 1, the world in general and each region in 
particular benefit from the complete adoption of the RR technology. Similarly, the 
differentiated market equilibrium scenarios yield even higher overall gains, which means that 
the theoretically possible immiserizing growth discussed in Chapter 3.3 does not take place. 
Relative to the pre-innovation benchmark, U.S. farmers, unlike in Scenario 1, are 
guaranteed to benefit from the RR technology because the LDP price is binding and the gain 
stems from the cost-reducing nature of RR innovation. This price distortion however 
depresses the RR prices worldwide to the degree that farmers in Brazil and Argentina lose 
whenever segregation costs are positive and are able to gain only in the zero segregation cost 
case when 50% of their production is in the higher-priced conventional market. 
Beyond that the LDP scenario offers the same welfare and price movement patterns 
as the no-LDP scenario when segregation costs start to decline. This decline causes 
conventional consumer prices to decline. Conventional producer prices increase, the RR 
market share declines, and this drives the RR prices up. The net effect on the ROW 
consumer surplus is positive, but consumers in other regions where only the cheaper RR 
products are purchased see their welfare gains lessened. Producer surplus in Argentina, 
Brazil and the ROW improves with lower segregation costs, but is unaffected in the United 
States where farmers receive a fixed LDP price. 
The objective of the price subsidy in the United States is to help its farmers. 
However, its overall effect on U.S. and world welfare can be negative. The results in Tables 
CI and C3 can be subtracted from each other to show how welfare changes when LDPs are 
introduced in the soybean complex with differentiated tastes and potentially segregated 
markets. These welfare changes are presented in Table C5, Appendix C. 
The U.S. price support puts a downward pressure on prices worldwide and benefits 
consumers across the world. Obviously, it benefits U.S. farmers. Also, it benefits the 
innovator-monopolist by improving the worldwide adoption of the RR technology. 
However, it hurts Brazilian, Argentine and ROW producers who see their competitive 
positions worsened. It also puts pressure on the U.S. government budget: the amount of the 
subsidy exceeds 30% of the world's gross welfare gain from introducing the RR technology 
in the marketplace. As a result, the LDP scenario is welfare reducing in the United States 
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despite the fact that the region's consumers and producers both benefit. Brazil and Argentina 
lose in this LDP scenario relative to the no-LDP one, but the ROW emerges as the only 
region that benefits from the introduction of LDPs at all levels of segregation costs. If not for 
the innovator-monopolist's profit that creates an externality, LDPs would hurt world's welfare 
for all levels of segregation costs. Thanks to that profit, however, LDPs are found globally 
welfare improving at the low (S6.6/MT) level of segregation costs. This is because 
monopoly pricing in the seed market results in a less than optimal adoption of efficient 
technology, whereas the output subsidy in the form of LDPs corrects this under-adoption and 
puts the industry in the second-best equilibrium. 
6.3. Scenario 3: Production Ban on RR Products in the ROW 
In this and the next two sections I provide estimates of how regional welfare and 
trade are affected by protectionist government policies that are already observed in the 
soybean world or that are being contemplated and may be implemented in the future. 
Scenario 3 looks at the measure that the European Union and several Asian countries that are 
part of the Rest of the World region have currently in place - the ban on production of RR 
soybeans and products. Results in Table C6 of Appendix C are provided both for the LDP 
and no-LDP scenarios in the United States. They show that under the medium and high 
segregation costs the Rest of the World benefits from the ban. 
The ban on RR production in the ROW results in the situation of complete regional 
specialization at positive levels of segregation costs. Because the ROW is restricted to 
produce only the conventional variety, which allows it to meet its domestic demand for 
conventional soybean products, the United States, Brazil and Argentina specialize in the RR 
variety and export it to the Rest of the World. No segregation technology is needed in this 
case, de facto segregation costs are zero in equilibrium and the level of segregation costs 
postulated by the technology does not affect the equilibrium solution. 
In the zero-segregation-cost case lower conventional prices generate more demand for 
conventional products than ROW farmers can handle and the United States emerges as the 
second region producing conventional soybeans by allocating 4% of its land to it. At all 
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levels of segregation costs, all agents benefit relative to the pre-innovation benchmark. 
However, if LDPs are introduced, ROW producers stand to lose relative to the pre-innovation 
benchmark because the region's conventional prices fall whereas technology remains the 
same. The decrease in the conventional prices is observed for soybeans and soybean meal, 
and conventional soybean oil prices increase in comparison to the pre-innovation benchmark. 
This decrease in the conventional soybean price as a result of the introduction of RR 
technology was not observed in other scenarios. It is due to the particular nature of the ban, 
in which the region that consumes conventional variety is allowed to specialize in its 
production at no additional segregation cost, while other regions provide cheap exports of the 
RR variety to some Rest of the World consumers willing to buy it. 
Comparison to unregulated production scenarios from Tables CI and C3 is provided 
in Table C7, Appendix C. It shows that RR production ban in the Rest of the World appears 
to improve the ROW's welfare in the $35-55 million range if segregation costs are medium 
to high. The welfare gain is driven by the positive change in consumer surplus thanks to the 
lower conventional product prices (driven down by zero segregation costs) under the ban. It 
more than offsets the corresponding negative change in producer surplus and happens only at 
sufficiently high levels of segregation costs that depress consumer surpluses in the 
unregulated equilibrium. The positive effect of the ban on the Rest of the World holds both 
in the no-LDP and LDP scenarios. Whenever the ban benefits the Rest of the World, it also 
benefits Brazil and Argentina but hurts the Unites States, reducing its welfare by $80-90 
million, primarily because of the forgone innovator-monopolist profit. 
6.4. Scenario 4: Production Ban on RR Products in BrazU 
To date, Brazil has not adopted RR soybeans due to the government's position on the 
GMO issue, which is essentially tantamount to a production ban. This can be explained by 
Brazil's interest in avoiding segregation costs in order to gain a competitive advantage 
selling conventional soybeans and soybean products to the Rest of the World. Results for 
this ban scenario are summarized in Tables C8 and C9, where both the no-LDP and LDP 
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scenarios are considered. It appears that the ban on RR production in Brazil does not benefit 
the region overall, although it benefits its farmers. 
The ban on production of RR soybeans in Brazil results in the complete regional 
specialization in production at medium and high segregation costs, with the United States and 
Argentina producing only the RR variety and exporting it to the Rest of the World that also 
produces only RR beans. Under the low and zero segregation costs the United States begins 
to produce both varieties, with conventional production being exclusively exported to the 
ROW. 
As in the no-ban Scenario 1, introduction of RR technology results in higher 
conventional prices for consumers and lower RR prices. Because Brazil specializes in 
producing conventional beans, it does not incur segregation cost and therefore prices 
received by Brazilian farmers also increase relative to the pre-innovation benchmark. These 
higher prices benefit the region's farmers but hurt its consumers who in equilibrium consume 
the domestically grown and crushed conventional products despite having no differentiated 
tastes. 
The same happens in the LDP scenario at positive segregation costs. When 
segregation costs are zero, Argentina joins Brazil in producing conventional soybeans with 
the RR adoption rate of 52%. In this case not only consumers but also producers show 
welfare losses relative to the pre-innovation benchmark as Brazil posts lower soybean and 
meal prices and higher oil prices. 
Welfare changes between the ban and no-ban scenarios are provided in Table C9. It 
is clear that whereas at all positive levels of segregation costs Brazilian farmers gain from the 
ban by switching to higher-priced conventional soybeans, the same switch in consumption 
due to the non-competitive pricing from potential RR imports (see Chapter 7.3 for more on 
this issue) hurts the region more and results in a net loss of welfare in the neighborhood of 
$100 million. This conclusion applies both to the no-LDP and LDP scenarios and to the 
zero-segregation-cost case in which both consumer and producer welfare decline as a result 
of the ban. These findings suggest that Brazil does not have economic reasons to continue 
not adopting RR technology and if it does continue to bar RR soybeans then the reasons are 
either political or related to a farmer lobby that benefits from the status quo. 
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6.5. Scenario 5: Production Bans on RR Products in Brazil and the ROW 
What if the Rest of the World and Brazil were to ban RR production simultaneously? 
This logical extension of Scenarios 3 and 4 is summarized in Tables CIO and Cl 1, Appendix 
C. My results suggest that such simultaneous production bans are welfare reducing for both 
regions implementing it, and for the world in general. 
Both the no-LDP and LDP scenarios result in equilibria with full specialization in 
production and therefore segregation cost levels are irrelevant in determining equilibrium. 
Brazil and the Rest of the World are forced to produce only conventional soybeans, with 
Brazil exporting to the ROW, and the United States and Argentina both produce only RR 
soybeans and soybean products for domestic consumption and export to the ROW. 
With two regions growing conventional soybeans the size of the conventional 
soybean sector proves to be quite large in equilibrium. As a result, equilibrium is 
characterized by equal conventional and RR soybean and oil prices in the Rest of the World, 
with 17% of the indifferent demand attributed to conventional soybeans and soybean oil at 
these prices in the no-LDP scenario. In general, all prices in this equilibrium are lower than 
their pre-innovation benchmark counterparts, implying that consumers gain from the RR 
technology in all regions and producers in Brazil and the ROW lose. 
The welfare comparison between the ban and no-ban scenarios is provided in Table 
Cl 1. The forced abundance of the conventional variety and a relative scarcity of the RR 
product imply that equilibrium conventional prices in the ban scenario are lower than their 
counterparts in the unregulated scenario, whereas RR prices are higher. As a result, only 
producers in Brazil and the Rest of the World lose. All but the ROW consumers lose in all 
positive segregation cost scenarios, and Argentina emerges as the only region that benefits 
from the simultaneous RR production bans in Brazil and the Rest of the World. Brazil loses 
approximately $260 million, while the ROW may lose between $80 and $170 million 
depending on the level of segregation costs. 
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6.6. Scenario 6: Production and Import Bans on RR Products in the ROW 
Depending on the severity of GMO aversion in the European Union and other 
countries manifested in their official government regulations, the Rest of the World may 
choose to ban any presence of crops and food products with biotech content on its territory. 
For the soybean complex this would mean that the ROW will ban any RR imports in addition 
to RR production, which will have dramatic consequences for production patterns in 
exporting regions as some of them will have to scale back on their adoption of RR 
technology. The impact of the RR import ban in addition to the RR production ban in the 
ROW is estimated in Table C12, Appendix C. Results for the scenario when, in addition to 
ROW bans, Brazil bans RR production are provided in Table CI3. The welfare changes 
between the ban and no-ban scenarios in both cases are shown in Table CI4. In all tables, 
the effects of the import ban are illustrated using the no-LDP scenario only. 
First, let's consider the case when Brazil does not ban RR production. Having no 
export destination for the RR soybeans and products, the Unites States, Argentina and Brazil 
each produce both varieties - RR for domestic consumption and conventional for export to 
the ROW. Depending on the level of segregation costs, U.S. adoption rate for RR 
technology is 62-67%, Brazilian - 49-52%, and Argentine - 28-30%. The common feature 
of lower RR and higher conventional prices relative to the pre-innovation benchmark 
explains consumer surplus increases in the Unites States, Brazil and Argentina as RR 
technology is introduced. ROW consumers experience very large losses of up to $1.5 billion 
when segregation costs are high because of unavailability of cheaper RR variety. This fact 
drives the overall welfare loss for the ROW as a result of the introduction of RR technology. 
Other regions gain despite the welfare losses by producers, and the world's welfare improves 
in all but the high-segregation-cost scenarios. 
Adding RR production ban in Brazil changes the characteristics of the equilibrium 
only to the extent that Brazil experiences a loss of consumer surplus due to consumption of 
more expensive conventional products and an increase in the producer surplus due to 
specialization. However, unlike the Rest of the World, Brazil's overall welfare improves as 
compared to the pre-innovation benchmark. 
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Welfare comparisons between the unregulated and ban scenarios show that all regions 
lose overall as a result of the combined production and import ban in the ROW no matter 
whether Brazil introduces the RR production ban or not. The only benefiting parties are 
consumers in unregulated regions and ROW producers at medium and high levels of 
segregation cost. 
6.7. Economic Benefits of RR Technology Under Alternative Market Structures 
The fact that one of the players in the soybean complex is the innovator-monopolist 
producing RR seed raises a series of important questions about the role that the existing 
market power plays in determining equilibrium outcomes in differentiated markets. The new 
RR technology has been developed and patented in the United States by Monsanto, and the 
size of its spillover to world's regions measured by their adoption rates p depends, both in 
the present model and in real life, on the level of monopoly rents extracted from farmers. Of 
course, the competitive provision of the new technology is the most beneficial. On the other 
hand, the present model relies on observed monopolistic behavior instead of solving for the 
optimal behavior endogenously, leaving open the question whether observed behavior is 
optimal and whether optimal behavior is attainable. 
To address these questions, I provide solutions to the soybean trade model described 
by equations (4.1) - (4.14) for the three levels of monopolist's RR seed markup: n ={0,0,0, 
0}, // ={0.4,0.4,0.4,0.4}, and n that maximizes innovator-monopolist's profit. Note that 
the baseline solutions to the model are obtained assuming n ={0.4,0.2, 0.2, 0.2}. Results of 
these simulations are provided in Table CI5, Appendix C, for the specific level of 
segregation cost (S13.2/MT) and two no-LDP scenarios: unregulated and the RR production 
ban in Brazil and the Rest of the World simultaneously. 
The n ={0,0,0,0} case represents the competitive provision of RR technology 
worldwide. As shown in Table CI5, the United States is the only region producing both 
soybean varieties, while other regions specialize in the RR variety, in line with the baseline 
equilibrium when n ={0.4,0.2,0.2,0.2} (Table CI). However, U.S. rate of adoption 
increases from 90% to 95% because RR soybeans become more attractive, and U.S. welfare 
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gain is $400 million smaller as it is being re-allocated to other regions. Overall, the world 
welfare gain increases by only 1%. Adoption rates in the simultaneous Brazil/ROW RR 
production ban do not change as the United States and Argentina already have 100% 
adoption rates. 
If the innovator-monopolist was able to enforce IPRs equally in all parts of the world, 
the new technology could be sold at a markup n ={0.4,0.4,0.4, 0.4} based on what 
Monsanto currently charges in the United States. In that case the monopolist's profit would 
be $1,133 million, which is $350 million higher than the baseline case. The welfare gains in 
other regions would be smaller, but the overall worldwide welfare loss relative to the 
baseline equilibrium would be only $2 million. 
What is the optimal markup? Table CI 5 shows it for the scenario when both Brazil 
and the Rest of the World impose a production ban on RR soybeans, which is the closest 
representation of the current situation in the soybean complex. Here I assume that the 
markup remains at 20% in Argentina where the enforcement of intellectual property rights by 
Monsanto had little success. When segregation cost is $13.2/MT, the estimated optimal 
markup is n ={1.5,0.0,0.2,0.0}, which proves to be especially taxing for consumers 
because of higher production costs that result in higher equilibrium prices worldwide. The 
high 150% markup arises in the United States because of the low conventional prices (they 
equal RR prices in this equilibrium with forced overproduction of the conventional variety 
and sizable consumption by indifferent consumers) that also have to be reduced by the 
amount of segregation cost when evaluating relative profitability of the two varieties at farm 
level. If segregation costs were zero, the optimal markup would be n ={0.73,0.0, 0.2,0.0}, 
thirty-three percentage points higher than currently observed in the United States. 
To summarize, the present model does not appear to be sensitive to small variations 
in the innovator-monopolist's seed price markup around the baseline assumption. At the 
same time, the baseline assumption of fi ={0.4,0.2,0.2,0.2} that is based on currently 
observed monopolist's behavior is far from the optimal. Still, the optimal markup rates that 
are three to four times higher than the existing ones may be practically unattainable. 
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CHAPTER 7. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
The results discussed in Chapter 6 are based on several parametric assumptions and a 
number of parameter estimates. Specifically, assumptions were made with respect to the 
three parameters that describe differentiated demands for soybeans and soybean oil in the 
Rest of the World: the share of "indifferent" demand &, the coefficient of total demand 
increase due to conventional and RR price equalization k, and the own price elasticity of 
conventional demand s00. Among the estimated parameters the ones with perhaps the least 
consensus in the research literature regarding their values are the own price elasticities of 
demand for non-segregated soybean, oil and meal suu, the elasticity of land supply with 
respect to soybean price y/, and the coefficient of yield increase due to the RR technology fi. 
Needless to say, all parameters including the ones just mentioned were researched in every 
detail and their proposed values are believed to provide as close a representation of the world 
soybean market as exists today and as it will most likely look in the near future. 
Nevertheless, the sensitivity analysis of key parameters is necessary to evaluate the 
robustness of conclusions that emerged from the model's results and to understand whether 
these conclusions are subject to change if the model's parameter values were different. Two 
parameters were already indirectly subjected to the sensitivity analysis when the model was 
solved for four levels of segregation costs and when the effect of alternative market 
structures was studied by varying the innovator-monopolist's seed price markup. Therefore, 
no additional sensitivity analysis for parameters cp and fj. will be offered in this chapter. 
The six parameters and their base and suggested alternative values that form this 
chapter's analysis are summarized in Table 7.1. To keep the scope of the analysis 
manageable, I restrict the sensitivity discussion to the no-LDP scenario with the S13.2/MT 
segregation cost in each region. The tables in Appendix D provide equilibrium adoption and 
welfare results for the model's simulations under the new parameter values. Each table 
contains results for the "free trade" scenario (scenario in which regions do not implement any 
production or trade bans), and all ban scenarios discussed in Chapter 6.3 through Chapter 6.6. 
Increases and decreases in each parameter value are implemented ceteris paribus (that is, 
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Table 7.1. Base and Alternative Values of Parameters Used in Sensitivity Analysis 
Parameter Base Value Alternative Value 1 Alternative Value 2 
£UU {-0.4,-0.4,-0.4,-0.4} Base Value % y2 Base Value * 2 
¥ {0.8,1.0,0.8,0.6} Base Value % >/2 Base Value x 2 
P {0,0,0,0} Base Value + 0.02 — 
â -4.5 Base Value % % Base Values x l >/3 
k 1.05 Base Value - 0.025 Base Value + 0.025 
0.5 Base Value % % Base Values x I '/3 
holding all other parameters at their base values). In the tables, the model's results for the 
base values of parameters are also shown for the ease of comparison. One ancillary outcome 
of the sensitivity analysis that I carried out was to demonstrate that the soybean complex can 
have multiple trade and market equilibria because of the nonconvexity introduced by the 
discontinuous constant segregation cost function. Finally, I discuss how different 
assumptions regarding the transportation costs between Argentina and Brazil may affect the 
equilibrium solution for Brazil's RR production ban scenario. Recall that in this equilibrium 
Brazilian consumers purchase conventional soybean and soybean oil variety despite the fact 
that that they don't have differentiated tastes. I show that it is possible that they choose to 
import RR products in equilibrium, although this would probably not be allowed as it 
violates the purpose of production ban. 
7.1. Model's Sensitivity to Non-Segregated Demand and Supply Parameters 
The effects of halving and doubling the base values of elasticities of (total) demand 
for non-segregated soybeans, soybean oil and soybean meal are presented in Table Dl, 
Appendix D. Setting êuu =-0.2 for all soybean products in all regions does not change 
production or trade patterns in the free trade equilibrium, nor does it change the fact that all 
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regions and the world in general benefit from the RR technology. However, compared to the 
base-values scenario, it changes the distribution of welfare gains between consumers and 
producers by increasing consumer benefits and reducing producer gains. While in the base-
values scenario consumers worldwide received 38% of the total welfare gain, the halved 
elasticity would imply that they reaped 49%. Doubling s1"' for all products in all regions 
has the opposite effect: consumers in that case benefit less than in the base-values scenario 
(33% of the total welfare gain) while producers benefit more. The innovator-monopolist* s 
profit remains essentially insensitive to variations in i"u. 
Subjecting the ban scenarios (scenarios 3-6, Chapter 6) to the same changes in non-
segregated demand elasticities does not change any conclusions regarding the direction of 
their impact on the four regions. As in the base-values scenario, the Rest of the World still 
benefits from the production ban on RR products, enjoying no segregation costs and hence 
lower conventional prices. Brazilian farmers still benefit from the RR production ban at their 
home, but overall Brazil loses while the Rest of the World gains again thanks to lower 
conventional prices relative to the free trade equilibrium. Simultaneous RR production bans 
in Brazil and the Rest of the World, as well as additional import bans on RR products in the 
latter region continue to hurt the welfare in regions that initiate them. The distribution of 
welfare between consumers and producers in these ban scenarios changes in the same 
manner as in the free trade case as demand elasticities are halved and doubled, but the overall 
region-level results appear robust. 
Table D2, Appendix D, summarizes the adoption and welfare results when the 
elasticity of land supply with respect to soybean prices y/ is halved or doubled. Doubling y/ 
works just the opposite of doubling suu, and the same can be said about halving y/ versus 
halving êau. When yr is doubled, consumers gain more relative to the pre-innovation 
benchmark than in the base-values scenario and producers gain less, and when y/ is halved -
vice versa. Innovator-monopolist's profit shows more sensitivity as supply elasticity changes 
but is still very robust as its deviation is within 1% of the base value. Again, none of the 
qualitative results of the ban scenarios change. 
The model's results appear quite sensitive to the change in the yield increase 
parameter due to the RR technology p. As discussed in Moschini, Lapan and Sobolevsky 
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(2000), experimental evidence suggests that the RR soybean yields are somewhat lower than 
the yields of their conventional counterparts. However, these results could be impacted by 
the farmers' economic decisions, could be temporarily caused by the fact that the RR 
technology is gradually working its way into better commercial varieties, and thus could be 
misleading. Also, the additive nature of the RR technology gives us reasons to believe that 
RR soybeans should potentially outperform conventional varieties thanks to better weed 
management. Indeed, Monsanto has argued that the RR technology gives a 5% yield edge. 
In what follows, I assume a more moderate yield gain of p =0.02 (2%) and provide results in 
Table D3, Appendix D. 
A positive yield gain associated with the RR technology is equivalent to the outward 
supply shift relative to the base-values scenario. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the free 
trade equilibrium with p =0.02 all prices are lower, which leads to the reallocation of welfare 
gains between consumers and producers. In this equilibrium, the United States has the 88% 
adoption rate versus the 90% in the base-values scenario, and all regions benefit from the RR 
technology. However, while both producers and consumers benefited at the world level from 
the new technology in the base-values scenario, producers at the world level lose and 
consumers gain when ,9=0.02. At the region level, Brazilian and U.S. farmers lose by 
adopting the RR technology. 
This result also applies to all production and import ban scenarios, although overall 
region-level results of the bans are robust to the increase in the yield parameter. For 
example, while the Rest of the World still benefits from the home production ban on RR 
products thanks to large consumer benefits, ROW farmers find themselves not only worse off 
than before the ban but also worse off than before the RR technology was adopted. 
To summarize, the sensitivity analysis with respect to the three non-segregated 
demand and supply parameters shows that the qualitative results and the general model's 
conclusions for the free trade and all ban scenarios discussed in Chapter 6 are robust. What 
is subject to change is the distribution of welfare between producers and consumers. Also, 
the baseline argument that in all regions but the United States producers gain when the RR 
technology is introduced is sensitive to the value of yield parameter and the higher value of 
this parameter may force other regions' producers to lose in equilibrium. What is most 
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robust is the profit of innovator-monopolist, which remains essentially unaffected by these 
parametric changes. 
7.2. Model's Sensitivity to Differentiated Demand Parameters 
Parameter à measures the share of demand that is indifferent between the 
conventional and the RR varieties when the conventional variety's price is the same as the 
price for the RR (non-segregated) product in the reference year. This indifferent demand can 
be met by consuming either variety. The parameter is used both in the soybean and the 
soybean oil differentiated demand functions and is set to 0.5 (50%) for both products in the 
base-values scenario. In other words, at a particular price level, with prices of both varieties 
the same, 50% of consumers demand conventional variety and 50% are indifferent as to 
which one to consume. 
This assumption appears to be quite reasonable when applied to the Rest of the World 
and in particular to the European Union. A recent survey of 16,000 EU citizens 
(Eurobarometer, 2001) found that 56.5% of those questioned believe that GMO based food is 
dangerous, while the rest either do not believe so or do not have an opinion. For the purpose 
of the sensitivity analysis, I select alternative values of â =0.333 and à =0.667 (the same for 
soybeans and soybean oil) and report results in Table D4, Appendix D. 
As can be seen from the formulas of differentiated demand coefficients provided in 
Appendix B, parameter â affects slopes and intercepts of both the conventional and RR 
demands. This leads to changes in equilibrium prices and quantities in all scenarios 
including the pre-innovation benchmark simulation, which makes comparisons of RR-
technology-induced welfare changes between the base-values and alternative-values 
scenarios not trivial. What is clear in this case, however, is that lower â increases the 
relative share of the worldwide conventional demand and reduces the share of demand for the 
RR variety, causing the higher conventional and lower RR equilibrium prices relative to the 
base-values scenario. Higher â works in the opposite direction by shrinking the size of the 
market for conventional products and depressing equilibrium conventional prices while 
increasing the RR ones. 
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Judging by the free trade results in Table D4, the Unites States remains the only 
producer of both varieties under different values of â, with adoption rate of 87% at low 
values and 93% at high values. Variation in â mainly affects the welfare of the Rest of the 
World consumers, causing only a small quantitative and no qualitative change in the benefits 
derived by other agents from the introduction of the RR technology. When â is small, ROW 
consumers gain 85% less than in the base-values scenario, and when â is high they gain 
120% more. 
Whereas simulating the RR production ban in the Rest of the World under low â 
does not produce new outcomes, the results for the high à =0.667 suggest that the Rest of the 
World does not benefit from the ban. The low share of GMO-conscious consumers in the 
region makes the Rest of the World production capacity too large for the size of the 
conventional market. This depresses conventional prices to the point where they equal RR 
prices and 81% of indifferent soybean and soybean oil demand at these prices is met by 
conventional varieties. Although this definitely benefits ROW consumers, it at the same time 
hurts domestic producers to the point where the ban is actually welfare reducing when 
compared to the free trade scenario. 
The RR production ban in Brazil benefits the Rest of the World consumers, too. In 
addition, as the results in Chapter 6 show, it benefited Brazilian producers who switched to 
producing higher priced conventional variety and benefited from it more than from producing 
less costly but lower priced RR soybeans in the free trade equilibrium. However, when 
à =0.667 this tradeoff stops working in their favor and Brazilian farmers lose under the 
production ban at home relative to the no-ban scenario. 
Another situation when the size of the market for conventional products affects the 
baseline result of the model is the simultaneous RR production ban in Brazil and the Rest of 
the World. Under the base and the high values of <7, the world produces more than the 
GMO-conscious consumers demand in the Rest of the World and therefore a portion of 
conventional products is used to meet undifferentiated demand in Brazil and indifferent 
demand in the Rest of the World (where conventional and RR prices are equal in 
equilibrium). This does not happen when â =0.333 and the size of the market for 
conventional products is much larger. In this case the Rest of the World benefits from the 
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ban when compared with the free trade scenario because of the combination of really 
favorable conditions under the ban and really unfavorable conditions under the free trade 
equilibrium with its high segregation costs. Brazil and the Unites States still lose and 
Argentina gains as in the base-values scenario. 
Parameter k is set to 1.05 for both soybean and soybean oil demands in the base-
values scenario implying that the total demand for each product grows 5% as the price for the 
conventional variety falls from the prohibitively high reference year level to the RR price 
level in the same year. The sensitivity analysis reported in Table D5 looks at two reasonable 
alternative levels of this parameter: k =1.025 and k =1.075. A lower k acts as the inward 
demand shift that lowers all prices (except for meal) in all equilibria, while a higher k acts as 
the outward demand shift that leads to the increase in soybean and soybean oil prices. The 
changes in the value of parameter k have some minor quantitative and no qualitative effects 
on the results of the model. 
The own-price elasticity of conventional demand £00, evaluated at the reference year 
RR price and the conventional price set to the same value, is assumed to equal -4.5 for both 
soybean and soybean oil demands in the baseline simulations of the model, to reflect the 
notion of close substitutability between the two varieties in the differentiated demand system. 
The two alternative values for this parameter are set to s00 =-3.0 and ê00 =-6.0 (for both 
soybean and soybean oil demands simultaneously) and the model's sensitivity results with 
respect to these values are provided in Table D6 of Appendix D. 
Given that the total soybean and soybean oil demands are inelastic, making 
conventional demands less own-price elastic translates into lower cross-price elasticity. This 
means less flexibility in the demand system to shift from consuming the conventional variety 
to the RR one. The opposite is true when the own-price elasticity is increased (in absolute 
value). As a result, the low-elasticity equilibrium is characterized by the relatively high share 
of the market for conventional products (13% in the free trade case), whereas in the high-
elasticity equilibrium this share is lower than in the base-values scenario (2% versus 4% in 
the free trade case). Not surprisingly, the welfare results of these simulations are very close 
to those of the low and high values of the share parameter à. 
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In the free trade equilibrium the adoption rate in the United States, the only region 
producing both soybean varieties, is 71% when s00 =-3.0 compared to the 90% rate in the 
base-values scenario and the 95% rate when £°° =-6.0. Similarly to what we have already 
seen in the sensitivity analysis for â, the gains to the Rest of the World consumers vary 
greatly depending on the value of s00 but remain positive. Also, when the Rest of the World 
bans RR production, it suffers a welfare loss when s00 =-6.0 for the same reasons as in the 
â =0.667 case, albeit prices for the conventional variety now are not as low as their RR 
counterparts but are low enough. Finally, the Rest of the World benefits from the 
simultaneous RR production bans at home and in Brazil when £00 =-3.0 much alike as in the 
a =0.333 discussion. The innovator-monopolist profit remains robust in all ban scenarios but 
is affected by the low adoption rate in the free trade scenario with low elasticity. 
In summary, differentiated demand parameters â and s00 appear to be much more 
crucial in determining the direction of results of several ban scenarios introduced in Chapter 
6. While the sensitivity analysis confirms that all regions and the world in general benefit 
from the introduction of the RR technology at medium segregation costs, the size of the 
benefit, especially for the Rest of the World consumers, and the level of adoption of the RR 
technology in the free trade scenario are the increasing functions of the (absolute) value of 
either parameter. The conclusion that the Rest of the World benefits from home production 
ban on RR products is positively related to the equilibrium share of the market for 
conventional soybean products, which in turn is negatively related to the size of â and i00, 
and the same can be said about the benefit of Brazil's RR production ban for its farmers. 
Also, the Rest of the World may gain from a simultaneous RR production ban at home and in 
Brazil when at least one of the parameters is low. Which of the results are more likely to 
hold can clearly be the subject of speculation in the present environment because 
differentiated markets for soybean products are in their infancy, but some thoughts on that 
will be offered in the concluding Chapter 8. 
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7.3. The Possibility of Multiple Equilibria and the Effect of Low Brazil-Argentina 
Transortation Costs 
There are two more results that have surfaced in Chapter 6 discussions that are 
subject to change under alternative parametric assumptions. The first one is the uniqueness 
of the market and trade equilibrium described by equations (4.1) - (4.13). The segregation 
cost function described by equations (3.12) - (3.13) creates a nonconvexity in the production 
space because of the discontinuity at the point where the region switches between producing 
no RR soybeans and producing some. Specifically, the segregation cost is assumed to be 
zero when only conventional soybeans are produced and a positive constant when at least 
some RR soybean production takes place. Therefore, the uniqueness of equilibrium cannot 
be guaranteed. Although neither the baseline nor the sensitivity simulations of the model's 
scenarios result in more than one equilibrium, taking some parameters to extreme values 
leads to a multi-equilibrium example. This example appears in Table D7, Appendix D. 
The two equilibria exist when a no-LDP scenario with the S13.2/MT segregation cost 
is run with unusually low own-price conventional demand elasticity £00 =-1.0. The free trade 
Equilibrium #1 in Table D7 is characterized by the 61% rate of adoption of RR technology in 
the United States and 73% in Brazil, with Argentina and the Rest of the World specializing in 
RR production. This equilibrium holds no matter whether the discontinuity in the constant 
S13.2/MT segregation cost is allowed or it is assumed that the S13.2/MT cost applies when a 
region specializes in conventional soybean production. Equilibrium #2 is possible only in the 
former case (the case of this dissertation). In it, the Rest of the World takes advantage of the 
zero segregation cost in the no-adoption case, enjoys a welfare gain over the pre-innovation 
benchmark and contributes to a higher worldwide welfare gain relative to Equilibrium #1. 
Equilibrium #2 represents a voluntary welfare-enhancing ban on RR production in the Rest 
of the World. It suggests, at least theoretically, that it is possible that a region's government 
that pursues protectionist policy can improve its own and the world's welfare by sending the 
markets on the welfare-enhancing equilibrium path. It must be reiterated, however, that it 
does not happen in this model within the reasonable range of parameter values. 
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The second result concerns Scenario 4 (Chapter 6.4) - the RR production ban in 
Brazil. The unique equilibrium solution for this scenario (see Table C8, Appendix C) 
suggests that Brazilian consumers demand conventional soybeans and soybean oil despite the 
fact that they do not have differentiated tastes. This is the result of quite high transportation 
costs between Brazil and Argentina that are assumed to be two-thirds of the transportation 
cost from either region to the Rest of the World (see Table 5.2 in Chapter 5). Because at 
present the large-scale shipments of soybeans and soybean products do not take place 
between Brazil and Argentina, it is difficult to say whether these cost estimates are high or 
low. If they were assumed to be one-fourth of the transportation costs between South 
America and the Rest of the World, the equilibrium results would be as shown in Table D8, 
Appendix D. 
Table D8 provides price, production, consumption and welfare results in this 
equilibrium. In the case of low Brazil-Argentina transportation costs and Brazil's ban on RR 
production Brazil would consume conventional soybeans but will import the RR variety from 
Argentina to meet its soybean oil and meal demands, which will not benefit Brazil relative to 
the high-transportation cost case but will benefit the Rest of the World. The problem with 
this equilibrium lies in the assumption that Brazil runs a zero segregation cost even though 
RR products enter the region, which is unreasonable. In order for the government of Brazil 
to maintain competitive advantage in the conventional soy markets by means of the RR 
production ban and zero segregation cost it should probably run a concurrent consumption 
(or import) ban on RR products. In the present model, such a consumption ban is implicitly 
imposed by means of (prohibitively) high transportation costs. 
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CHAPTERS. CONCLUSIONS 
In this dissertation I have developed a new partial equilibrium four-region world trade 
model for the soybean complex comprising soybeans, soybean oil and soybean meal, to study 
some of the economic questions arising from the large-scale adoption of genetically modified 
soybeans. The distinctive feature of the model is that consumers in one of the four regions -
the Rest of the World - view genetically modified Roundup Ready soybeans, and products 
derived from them, as weakly inferior to their conventional counterparts. The model 
provides as close a representation of the world soybean market as exists today, and as it will 
most likely evolve in the near future. Specifically, the model explicitly accounts for the fact 
that the RR seed is patented and sold worldwide by a U.S. firm at a premium, and that 
producers have to employ a costly segregation technology in order to separate conventional 
and biotech products in the supply chain. Differentiated preferences were introduced into the 
model in a consistent fashion that permits standard welfare calculations. Finally, the model 
is disaggregated just enough to capture individual behavior of the industry's main players 
and analyze the impact of their policies toward GMOs. The calibrated model was solved for 
equilibrium prices, quantities, production patterns, trade flows and welfare changes under 
different assumptions regarding market structure, differentiated consumer tastes, regional 
governments' production and trade policies, and several other demand and supply 
characteristics. Finally, the restrictions on the particular parameter values used at the 
calibration stage were evaluated through an extensive sensitivity analysis. 
My analysis offers a comprehensive view of the evolution of agricultural 
biotechnology in the soybean complex and begins with the pre-innovation benchmark - the 
state of the world in which the RR technology is not yet available. I show that in the world 
with no feasible segregation technology, the long-run equilibrium state of the world after the 
cost-saving RR technology is introduced is that of complete worldwide adoption. This 
equilibrium is characterized by lower prices for soybeans and soybean products, continued 
leading U.S. position in world soybean exports, and welfare gains to all regions and all 
economic agents (producers, consumers, and innovator-monopolist selling RR seed) except 
U.S. farmers. 
75 
Moving on to the case where segregation technology is available at a positive cost, 
my analysis shows that, absent any government production and trade regulations, the Unites 
States emerges as the only region producing both RR and conventional soybeans and all 
other regions specialize in RR production. The introduction of the RR technology leads to 
reduced prices for RR products, lower prices for producers of the conventional variety, and 
higher consumption prices of conventional products. Lower segregation costs reduce the 
latter price and increase the price received by farmers who grow the conventional variety. 
However, lower segregation costs are associated with more land allocated to growing 
conventional soybeans, which hurts the profit received by the innovator-monopolist. This 
result is an unwelcome feature for the soybean industry because it implies a conflict of 
interest between the RR input supplier and farmers who benefit from lower segregation costs. 
The world in general benefits from using the segregation technology at any feasible cost level 
as GMO-conscious consumers realize their right to choose. 
The analysis shows that an output subsidy received by U.S. farmers, although clearly 
beneficial for them and the region's consumers, is nevertheless welfare reducing to the 
United States as a whole because of the high cost of the subsidy. The only region that gains 
in this situation is the Rest of the World, but the world in general can potentially benefit from 
this policy as the subsidy works to correct a less-than-optimal adoption of the RR technology 
caused by the distorted RR seed prices established by the monopoly. 
The main lesson that is learned from considering what happens when the Rest of the 
World and Brazil impose production bans on RR products is that the Rest of the World has a 
clear potential to benefit from such a ban relative to the no-ban scenario, while in Brazil only 
farmers can take advantage of such regulation. In fact, my results suggest that the Rest of the 
World should benefit from the ban if segregation costs were medium-to-high, while Brazilian 
farmers should see welfare gains at all positive levels of segregation costs. These results, 
however, prove to be sensitive to the underlying assumptions about the relative share of the 
conventional soybean market in the Rest of the World, which is affected directly by the share 
parameter in the reference year and indirectly by the own-price conventional demand 
elasticity parameter for soybeans and soybean oil. The higher the size of the conventional 
market and/or the lower the elasticity of conventional demands, the more likely the observed 
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gains will hold. Also, it is possible that the Rest of the World can gain relative to the no-ban 
scenario when RR production bans are implemented in the two regions simultaneously, 
although this result is not observed at base parameter values. My analysis also shows that, 
whenever beneficial to the Rest of the World, production bans reduce U.S. welfare, which 
justifies the region's concerned position with regard to anti-GMO regulation. Which 
situation is more likely to emerge in reality is subject to speculation. If the model's baseline 
assumption of a 50 percent share of GMO-conscious consumers in the Rest of the World is 
accurate, then we would have welfare gains to these regions. 
The last important result of this dissertation is the robust welfare losses to all regions 
as the result of the introduction of an import ban on RR products in the Rest of the World. 
Overall, all conclusions of the model, except for those mentioned above, prove to be robust 
to variations in critical parameter values. As such, they provide a range of important insights 
into the channels through which benefits of the current Roundup Ready technology for the 
soybean industry are derived and explain the possible implications of existing and pending 
policies pursued by the main players in the world soybean complex. 
APPENDIX A. DEMAND SPECIFICATION 
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Figure A8. Demand curve for Roundup Ready soybeans 
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APPENDIX B. DEMAND CALIBRATION 
The analytical solution to the system (5.1) - (5.5) of equations that are used to 
calibrate the parameters of the demand system is as follows: 
(B.l) aQ=ô[k l-â) + ê°°(l-k)\  
(B.2) Û, = Q ^ -au (1 - kâ)(1 - k) -oo KCT — S 7 S 
(1 -a)k 
(B.3) 
P 
(B-4) 6,=# 
k( l -â) 
- £  
(B.5) c = — (1 -kâ)ê°°Q 
The requirements that all parameters of the demand system are strictly positive and 
that b0>c and 6, > c to satisfy curvature conditions translate into following restrictions on 
y A A I  Jf  J ^  QQ parameters k,a,s ,s  : 
(B.6) k> 1; <t < 1; kâ< 1; 500 > a-*)* Zl/u 
( l -kâ)(k-l)  
Given that we estimate that slfj = -0.4 in all regions i and for all products j and 
assume that kJ t = 1.05 and àJ t = 0.5 in differentiated markets for soybeans and soybean oil 
(j = B, O), must satisfy: 
(B.7) -8.842 <5™, <0 
Therefore, for the model that produced results shown in tables Cl - CI5 in Appendix 
C, we choose the value for ê™ approximately in the middle of the interval (B.7), at -4.5. 
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This is about the best we can do given that we know that goods 0 and 1 are close substitutes 
but have no factual knowledge of their elasticities because differentiated demands have not 
materialized yet. 
It may be instructive to see how this assumption affects elasticity of scale sr for 
beans and oil in differentiated markets. Evaluated at p° = pl = p, it equals: 
When s00 =-4.5 and other parameters are as set above, s' =-0.4014. This 
exercise demonstrates that our differentiated demand system - the way it is calibrated here 
and in the neighborhood of reference year's prices and quantities - permits sufficiently 
elastic individual differentiated demands while the total demand remains inelastic with 
respect to uniform changes in both varieties' prices, similar to current behavior of 
undifferentiated demands for commodity soybeans and oil. 
(B.8) s'W 
p =p  =p  % 
-00 (£-1)" 
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APPENDIX C. TABLES OF RESULTS 
Table CI. Economic Impact of RR Technology (No-LDP scenario): Changes from Pre-
Innovation Equilibrium. Production and Exports (millions of US $; millions of MT) 
ACS APS ATI" AW Soybean Supply Export (Equiv.)3 Export 
Region P Total Total Total Conv. RR Conv. RR Meal" 
Pre-innovation 
USA 0.00 70.1 26.9 2.3 
BR 0.00 35.6 18.8 5.1 
AR 0.00 21.1 15.3 0.9 
ROW 0.00 32.3 -60.9 -8.3 
No segregation technology 
USA 1.00 323 -117 830.8 1036.5 69.3 24.8 3.2 
BR 1.00 120 72 191.7 35.9 18.6 5.5 
AR 1.00 43 47 89.3 21.2 15.2 1.0 
ROW 1.00 125 121 246.6 32.6 -58.6 -9.7 
World 611 123 830.8 1564.1 
Segregation cost: S19.8/MT 
USA 0.95 310 -95 806.8 1021.2 3.7 65.8 3.7 21.3 3.2 
BR 1.00 116 83 199.0 0.0 35.9 0.0 18.6 5.5 
AR 1.00 41 53 94.4 0.0 21.3 0.0 15.3 1.0 
ROW 1.00 131 132 262.8 0.0 32.6 -3.7 -55.2 -9.7 
World 597 173 806.8 1577.3 
Segregation cost: S13.2/MT 
USA 0.90 301 -83 784.4 1002.9 7.0 62.5 7.0 18.1 3.1 
BR 1.00 112 90 201.7 0.0 36.0 0.0 18.7 5.5 
AR 1.00 40 57 96.9 0.0 21.3 0.0 15.3 1.0 
ROW 1.00 145 138 282.7 0.0 32.6 -7.0 -52.0 -9.7 
World 598 201 784.4 1584.2 
Segregation cost: S6.6/MT 
USA 0.70 275 -46 690.3 919.1 20.9 48.8 20.9 4.6 2.9 
BR 1.00 97 109 206.0 0.0 36.1 0.0 18.9 5.4 
AR 1.00 36 69 104.0 0.0 21.3 0.0 15.4 1.0 
ROW 1.00 198 155 353.1 0.0 32.7 -20.9 -38.9 -9.2 
World 606 286 690.3 1582.2 
Zero segregation cost 
USA 0.62 169 120 651.1 939.8 27.0 43.6 27.0 0.0 23 
BR 0.99 116 61 176.7 0.3 35.5 0.3 18.3 5.4 
AR 1.00 43 40 82.8 0.0 21.2 0.0 15.2 1.0 
ROW 1.00 399 111 510.9 0.0 32.5 -27.3 -33.5 -8.7 
World 727 332 651.1 1710.2 
a Exports of beans, oil and meal measured in bean equivalent required to support them. This representation is 
due to the model's inability to distinguish individual trade flows (see Chapter 4, eq. (4.15)). 
b Meal exports, additional to those imbedded in previous two columns. This separate figure arises from the fact 
that domestic crush to meet domestic oil demand usually produces excess domestic supply of meal (eq. (4.16)). 
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Table C2. Equilibrium Consumption and Prices3 (No-LDP scenario) (millions of MT; 
$/MT) 
Bean Price Oil Price Meal Bean Demand Oil Demand Meal 
Region P Conv. RR Conv. RR Price Conv. RR Conv. RR Demand 
Pre-innovation 
USA 0.00 181.9 480.2 143.6 5.4 6.8 27.9 
BR 0.00 171.9 470.2 133.6 1.5 2.8 7.0 
AR 0.00 171.9 470.2 133.6 0.8 0.9 3.0 
ROW 0.00 211.9 540.2 173.6 16.3 13.9 69.8 
No segregation technology 
USA 1.00 174.5 444.8 142.3 5.5 7.1 28.0 
BR 1.00 164.5 434.8 132.3 1.6 2.8 7.1 
AR 1.00 164.5 434.8 132.3 0.9 0.9 3.1 
ROW 1.00 204.5 504.8 172.3 15.7 13.6 70.0 
Segregation cost: 
USA 0.95 
S19.8/MT 
200.4 174.8 586.7 445.5 142.5 0.0 5.5 0.0 7.1 28.0 
BR 1.00 164.8 435.5 132.5 0.0 1.6 0.0 2.8 7.1 
AR 1.00 164.8 435.5 132.5 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 3.1 
ROW 1.00 230.4 204.8 616.4 505.5 172.5 3.7 12.4 0.0 13.6 69.9 
Segregation cost: 
USA 0.90 
S13.2/MT 
194.0 175.0 551.7 447.0 142.4 0.0 5.5 0.0 7.1 28.0 
BR 1.00 165.0 437.0 132.4 0.0 1.6 0.0 2.8 7.1 
AR 1.00 165.0 437.0 132.4 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 3.1 
ROW 1.00 224.0 205.0 611.7 507.0 172.4 4.8 11.3 0.4 13.3 69.9 
Segregation cost: S6.6/MT 
USA 0.70 187.9 175.5 522.8 454.5 141.4 0.0 5.5 0.0 7.0 28.1 
BR 1.00 165.5 444.5 131.4 0.0 1.6 0.0 2.8 7.1 
AR 1.00 165.5 444.5 131.4 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 3.1 
ROW 1.00 217.9 205.5 582.8 514.5 171.4 6.0 10.2 2.7 11.1 70.1 
Zero segregation 
USA 0.62 
cost 
183.6 177.9 502.9 471.1 140.5 0.0 5.4 0.0 6.9 28.2 
BR 0.99 173.6 164.2 492.9 440.7 130.5 0.0 1.6 0.0 2.8 7.1 
AR 1.00 164.2 440.7 130.5 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 3.1 
ROW 1.00 213.6 204.2 562.9 510.7 170.5 6.6 9.8 3.8 10.2 70.2 
8 Consumer prices. The price received by producers of conventional soybeans is lower by the amount of 
segregation cost. 
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Table C3. Economic Impact of RR Technology (LDP scenario): Changes from Pre-
Innovation Equilibrium. Production and Exports (millions of US $; millions of MT) 
Region P 
ACS APS 
Total Total 
AD" A in 
Subsidy 
AW 
Total 
Bean Supply 
Conv. RR 
Export (Equiv.)3 
Conv. RR 
Export 
Meal" 
Pre-innovationc 
USA 0.00 74.0 30.3 2.3 
BR 0.00 34.4 17.5 5.2 
AR 0.00 20.5 14.6 0.9 
ROW 0.00 31.8 -62.3 -8.4 
No Segregation technology 
USA 1.00 478 429 859.4 859.8 906.6 75.7 30.3 3.2 
BR 1.00 169 -51 117.2 34.0 16.4 5.6 
AR 1.00 62 -27 35.2 20.3 14.2 1.0 
ROW 1.00 472 7 479.4 31.7 -60.9 -9.9 
World 1181 358 859.4 859.8 1538.3 
Segregation cost = S19.8/MT 
USA 1.00 461 429 849.7 829.8 909.8 0.0 75.7 0.0 30.4 3.2 
BR 0.91 163 -38 125.4 3.1 31.0 3.1 13.3 5.6 
AR 1.00 60 -19 41.1 0.0 20.3 0.0 14.2 1.0 
ROW 1.00 460 20 479.7 0.0 31.8 -3.1 -57.9 -9.9 
World 1144 392 849.7 829.8 1556.0 
Segregation cost = S13.2/MT 
USA 1.00 455 429 846.0 818.5 911.1 0.0 75.7 0.0 30.4 3.2 
BR 0.87 161 -33 128.5 4.3 29.8 4.3 12.2 5.6 
AR 1.00 59 -16 43.3 0.0 20.3 0.0 14.2 1.0 
ROW 1.00 470 25 494.1 0.0 31.8 -4.3 -56.8 -9.9 
World 1144 405 846.0 818.5 1577.0 
Segregation cost = S6.6/MT 
USA 1.00 428 429 815.5 777.2 895.5 0.0 75.7 0.0 30.6 3.0 
BR 0.60 149 -14 134.6 13.9 20.4 13.9 2.9 5.5 
AR 1.00 55 -4 50.6 0.0 20.4 0.0 14.3 1.0 
ROW 1.00 474 42 516.3 0.0 31.8 -13.9 -47.8 -9.6 
World 1106 452 815.5 777.2 1597.0 
Zero segregation cost 
USA 1.00 396 429 771.5 726.8 869.5 0.0 75.7 0.0 30.9 2.8 
BR 0.51 129 15 144.3 17.1 17.4 17.1 0.0 5.4 
AR 0.50 50 9 59.3 10.3 10.2 10.3 4.2 1.0 
ROW 1.00 552 63 615.2 0.0 31.9 -27.4 -35.0 -9.1 
World 1127 517 771.5 726.8 1688.2 
a See footnote (a), Table Cl. 
b See footnote (b), Table Cl. 
c The value of pre-innovation subsidy is $1,205 million. 
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Table C4. Equilibrium Consumption and Prices3 (LDP scenario) (millions of MT; $/MT) 
Bean Price Oil Price Meal Bean Demand Oil Demand Meal 
Region p Conv. RR Conv. RR Price Conv. RR Conv. RR Demand 
Pre-innovation 
USA 0.00 176.6 468.7 139.5 5.5 6.9 28.2 
BR 0.00 166.6 458.7 129.5 1.6 2.8 7.1 
AR 0.00 166.6 458.7 129.5 0.9 0.9 3.1 
ROW 0.00 206.6 528.7 169.5 16.4 14.1 70.4 
No segregation technology 
USA 1.00 165.6 425.4 135.5 5.6 7.2 28.5 
BR 1.00 155.6 415.4 125.5 1.6 2.9 7.2 
AR 1.00 155.6 415.4 125.5 0.9 0.9 3.1 
ROW 1.00 195.6 485.4 165.5 16.0 13.9 71.0 
Segregation cost: 
USA 1.00 
S19.8/MT 
166.0 426.3 135.8 0.0 5.6 0.0 7.2 28.5 
BR 0.91 185.3 156.0 578.0 416.3 125.8 0.0 1.6 0.0 2.9 7.2 
AR 1.00 156.0 416.3 125.8 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 3.1 
ROW 1.00 225.3 196.0 599.0 486.3 165.8 3.1 13.1 0.0 13.9 71.0 
Segregation cost: 
USA 1.00 
S13.2/MT 
166.2 426.6 135.9 0.0 5.6 0.0 7.2 28.5 
BR 0.87 178.8 156.2 541.9 416.6 125.9 0.0 1.6 0.0 2.9 7.2 
AR 1.00 156.2 416.6 125.9 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 3.1 
ROW 1.00 218.8 196.2 599.3 486.6 165.9 4.3 12.1 0.0 13.8 71.0 
Segregation cost: 
USA 1.00 
S6.6/MT 
166.7 432.0 135.4 0.0 5.6 0.0 7.2 28.5 
BR 0.60 172.8 156.7 510.8 422.0 125.4 0.0 1.6 0.0 2.9 7.2 
AR 1.00 156.7 422.0 125.4 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 3.1 
ROW 1.00 212.8 196.7 580.8 492.0 165.4 5.5 11.0 1.5 12.4 71.1 
Zero segregation 
USA 1.00 
cost 
167.4 439.5 134.5 0.0 5.6 0.0 7.1 28.6 
BR 0.51 167.0 157.6 482.9 430.6 124.5 0.0 1.6 0.0 2.9 7.2 
AR 0.50 167.0 157.4 482.9 429.5 124.5 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 3.1 
ROW 1.00 207.0 197.4 552.9 499.5 164.5 6.6 9.9 3.7 10.3 71.2 
a Consumer prices. RR producer prices in US are S193/MT in all scenarios. The price received by producers of 
conventional soybeans in other regions is lower by the amount of segregation cost. 
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Table C5. Economic Impact of LDPs: Changes from No-LDP 
Scenario (millions of US $) 
Region P 
ACS 
Total 
APS 
Total 
AD" A in 
Subsidy 
AW 
Total 
No segregation technology 
USA 1.00 155 546 28.6 859.8 -129.9 
BR 1.00 49 -123 -74.5 
AR 1.00 19 -74 -54.1 
ROW 1.00 347 -114 232.8 
World 570 235 28.6 859.8 -25.8 
Segregation cost: S19.8/MT 
USA 151 524 42.9 829.8 -111.4 
BR 47 -121 -73.6 
AR 19 -72 -53.3 
ROW 329 -112 216.9 
World 547 219 42.9 829.8 -21.3 
Segregation cost: S13.2/MT 
USA 154 512 61.6 818.5 -91.8 
BR 49 -123 -73.2 
AR 19 -73 -53.6 
ROW 325 -113 211.4 
World 546 204 61.6 818.5 -7.2 
Segregation cost: S6.6/MT 
USA 153 475 125.2 777.2 -23.6 
BR 52 -123 -71.4 
AR 19 -73 -53.4 
ROW 276 -113 163.2 
World 500 166 125.2 777.2 14.8 
Zero segregation cost 
USA 227 309 120.4 726.8 -70.3 
BR 13 -46 -32.4 
AR 7 -31 -23.5 
ROW 153 -48 104.3 
World 400 185 120.4 726.8 -22.0 
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Table C6. Economic Impact of the RR Production Ban in the ROW. No-LDP and LDP 
Scenarios: Changes from Pre-Innovation Equilibrium. Production and Exports 
(millions of US $; quantities in millions of MT) 
ACS APS AD" A in AW Bean Supply Export (Equiv.)3 Export 
Region p Total Total Subsidy Total Conv. RR Conv. RR Meal" 
No-LDP Scenario 
Segregation cost = positive 
USA 1.00 239 9 674.9 0.0 922.2 0.0 70.0 0.0 26.0 2.6 
BR 1.00 81 137 217.7 0.0 36.2 0.0 19.2 5.3 
AR 1.00 30 85 115.6 0.0 21.4 0.0 15.5 1.0 
ROW 0.00 277 41 317.6 32.4 0.0 0.0 -60.7 -8.9 
World 626 272 674.9 0.0 1573.0 
Zero segregation cost 
USA 0.96 230 22 658.5 0.0 910.5 2.5 67.6 2.5 23.7 2.6 
BR 1.00 77 144 220.8 0.0 36.3 0.0 19.2 5.3 
AR 1.00 29 89 118.4 0.0 21.4 0.0 15.5 1.0 
ROW 0.00 298 10 308.2 32.3 0.0 -2.5 -58.5 -8.8 
World 634 266 658.5 0.0 1557.9 
LDP Scenario 
Any segregation cost 
USA 1.00 360 429 703.9 665.8 827.2 0.0 75.7 0.0 31.0 2.7 
BR 1.00 119 36 155.5 0.0 34.6 0.0 17.2 5.4 
AR 1.00 45 26 71.1 0.0 20.5 0.0 14.5 1.0 
ROW 0.00 537 -27 510.0 31.7 0.0 0.0 -62.7 -9.0 
World 1061 464 703.9 665.8 1563.7 
a See footnote (a), Table CI. 
b See footnote (b), Table CI. 
92 
Table Cl. Economic Impact of the RR Production Ban in the ROW: Changes from 
No-Ban Scenario (millions of US $) 
No LDP Scenario LDP Scenario 
ACS APS AD" AW ACS APS Ml" Âlïi AW 
Region Total Total Total Total Total Subsidy Total 
Segregation cost: S19.8/MT 
USA -71 104 -132 -99 -101 0 -146 -164 -83 
BR ' -35 54 19 -44 74 30 
AR -11 32 21 -15 45 30 
ROW 146 -91 55 77 -47 30 
World 29 99 -132 -4 -83 72 -146 -164 8 
Segregation cost: S13.2/MT 
USA -62 92 -110 -81 -95 0 -142 -153 -84 
BR -31 47 16 -42 69 27 
AR -10 28 19 -14 42 28 
ROW 132 -97 35 67 -52 16 
World 28 71 -110 -11 -83 59 -142 -153 -13 
Segregation cost: S6.6MT 
USA -36 55 -15 3 -68 0 -112 -111 -68 
BR -16 28 12 -30 50 21 
AR -6 16 12 -10 30 21 
ROW 79 -114 -36 63 -69 -6 
World 20 -14 -15 -9 -45 12 -112 -111 -33 
Zero segregation cost 
USA 61 -98 7 -29 -36 0 -68 -61 -42 
BR -39 83 44 -10 21 11 
AR -14 49 36 -5 17 12 
ROW -101 -101 -203 -15 -90 -105 
World -93 -66 7 -152 -66 -53 
00 
-61 -125 
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Table C8. Economic Impact of the RR Production Ban in Brazil. No-LDP and LDP 
Scenarios: Changes from Pre-Innovation Equilibrium. Production and Exports 
(millions of US $; quantities in millions of MT) 
ACS APS ADM A in AW Bean Supply Export (Equiv.)3 Export 
Region P Total Total Subsidy Total Conv. RR Conv. RR Meal" 
No-LDP Scenario 
Segregation cost: = $19.8/MT or$13.2/MT 
USA 1.00 326 -124 712.4 0.0 914.1 0.0 69.3 0.0 24.8 3.1 
BR 0.00 -94 188 93.1 36.6 0.0 20.4 0.0 4.7 
AR 1.00 43 45 87.2 0.0 21.2 0.0 15.2 1.0 
ROW 1.00 291 118 409.2 0.0 32.6 -20.4 -40.0 -8.8 
World 565 226 712.4 0.0 1503.6 
Segregation cost = S6.6/MT 
USA 0.99 321 -116 706.9 0.0 911.3 0.9 68.5 0.9 24.0 3.1 
BR 0.00 -90 178 87.6 36.6 0.0 20.3 0.0 4.7 
AR 1.00 42 47 88.9 0.0 21.2 0.0 15.3 1.0 
ROW 1.00 289 122 410.5 0.0 32.6 -21.2 -39.2 -8.8 
World 561 230 706.9 0.0 1498.2 
Zero segregation cost 
USA 0.77 231 23 609.7 0.0 863.4 15.9 54.2 15.9 10.3 2.7 
BR 0.00 -17 12 -5.7 35.6 0.0 19.0 0.0 4.9 
AR 1.00 30 90 119.1 0.0 21.4 0.0 15.5 1.0 
ROW 1.00 292 187 479.5 0.0 32.8 -34.9 -25.8 -8.6 
World 536 311 609.7 0.0 1456.2 
LDP Scenario 
Segregation cost 
1
 
f
 
USA 1.00 511 429 746.6 917.7 768.5 0.0 75.7 0.0 30.3 3.2 
BR 0.00 -61 81 19.2 34.9 0.0 18.5 0.0 4.7 
AR 1.00 66 -42 23.7 0.0 20.2 0.0 14.1 1.0 
ROW 1.00 686 -17 669.0 0.0 31.6 -18.5 -44.3 -9.0 
World 1201 451 746.6 917.7 1480.4 
Zero Segregation Cost 
USA 1.00 421 429 715.3 766.5 798.5 0.0 75.7 0.0 30.7 2.9 
BR 0.00 -21 -3 -23.6 34.4 0.0 17.7 0.0 4.9 
AR 0.52 54 -2 52.2 9.8 10.6 9.8 4.6 1.0 
ROW 1.00 597 46 643.5 0.0 31.8 -27.5 -35.2 -8.8 
World 1051 471 715.3 766.5 1470.7 
* See footnote (a), Table Cl. 
b See footnote (b), Table Cl. 
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Table C9. Economic Impact of the RR Production Ban in Brazil: Changes from No-
Ban Scenario (millions of US $) 
No LDP Scenario LDP Scenario 
ACS APS An" AW ACS APS An" A in AW 
Region Total Total Total Total Total Subsidy Total 
Segregation cost: S19.8/MT 
USA 16 -29 -94 -107 50 0 -103 88 -141 
BR -210 105 -106 -224 119 -106 
AR 2 -8 -7 6 -23 -17 
ROW 160 -14 146 226 -37 189 
World -32 53 -94 -74 57 59 -103 88 -76 
Segregation cost: S13.2/MT 
USA 25 -41 -72 -89 56 0 -99 99 -143 
BR -206 98 -109 -222 114 -109 
AR 3 -12 -10 7 -26 -20 
ROW 146 -20 127 216 -42 175 
World -33 25 -72 -81 57 46 -99 99 -97 
Segregation cost: S6.6MT 
USA 46 -70 17 -8 83 0 -69 141 -127 
BR -187 69 -118 -210 95 -115 
AR 6 -22 -15 11 -38 -27 
ROW 91 -33 57 212 -59 153 
World -45 -56 17 -84 95 -1 -69 141 -117 
Zero segregation cost 
USA 62 -97 -41 -76 25 0 -56 40 -71 
BR -133 -49 -182 -150 -18 -168 
AR -13 50 36 4 -11 -7 
ROW -107 76 -31 45 -17 28 
World -191 -21 -41 -254 -76 -46 -56 40 -218 
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Table CIO. Economic Impact of the Simultaneous RR Production Bans in Brazil and the 
ROW. No-LDP and LDP Scenarios: Changes from Pre-Innovation Equilibrium. 
Production and Exports (millions of US $; quantities in millions of MT) 
Region P 
ACS 
Total 
APS 
Total 
ATI" A in 
Subsidy 
AW 
Total 
Bean Supply 
Conv. RR 
Export (Equiv.)3 
Conv. RR 
Export 
Meal" 
No-LDP Scenario 
Any segregation cost 
USA 1.00 113 215 563.6 0.0 890.9 0.0 71.1 0.0 27.6 2.3 
BR 0.00 35 -96 -60.7 35.0 0.0 18.1 0.0 5.2 
AR 1.00 14 148 162.1 0.0 21.7 0.0 15.9 0.9 
ROW 0.00 271 -87 183.4 32.0 0.0 -18.1 -43.5 -8.4 
World 432 180 563.6 0.0 1175.7 
LDP Scenario 
Any segregation cost 
USA 1.00 158 429 591.6 313.6 865.4 0.0 75.7 0.0 31.7 2.3 
BR 0.00 49 -128 -78.8 33.6 0.0 16.5 0.0 5.2 
AR 1.00 19 122 141.9 0.0 21.1 0.0 15.1 0.9 
ROW 0.00 379 -119 260.5 31.4 0.0 -16.5 -46.8 -8.4 
World 606 305 591.6 313.6 1188.9 
a See footnote (a), Table CI. 
b See footnote (b), Table CI. 
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Table Cil. Economic Impact of the Simultaneous RR Production Bans in Brazil and 
the ROW: Changes from No-Ban Scenario (millions of US $) 
No LDP Scenario LDP Scenario 
ACS APS An" AW ACS APS An" A in AW 
Region Total Total Total Total Total Subsidy Total 
Segregation cost: S19.8/MT 
USA -197 310 -243 -130 -303 0 -258 -516 -44 
BR -81 -179 -260 -114 -90 -204 
AR -27 95 68 -41 141 101 
ROW 140 -219 -79 -81 -139 -219 
World -165 7 -243 -402 -538 -87 -258 -516 -367 
Segregation cost: S13.2/MT 
USA -188 298 -221 -112 -297 0 -254 -505 -46 
BR -77 -186 -262 -112 -95 -207 
AR -26 91 65 -40 138 99 
ROW 126 -225 -99 -91 -144 -234 
World -166 -21 -221 -409 -538 -100 -254 -505 -388 
Segregation cost: S6.6MT 
USA -162 261 -127 -28 -270 0 -224 -464 -30 
BR -62 -205 -267 -100 -114 -213 
AR -22 79 58 -36 126 91 
ROW 73 -242 -170 -95 -161 -256 
World -174 -106 -127 -407 -500 -147 -224 -464 -408 
Zero segregation cost 
USA -56 95 -88 -49 -238 0 -180 -413 -4 
BR -81 -157 -237 -80 -143 -223 
AR -29 108 79 -31 113 83 
ROW -128 -198 -328 -173 -182 -355 
World -295 -152 -88 -535 -521 -212 -180 -413 -499 
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Table C12. Economic Impact of the RR Production and Import Ban in the ROW. No-
LDP Scenario: Changes from Pre-Innovation Equilibrium. Production and Exports 
(millions of US $; quantities in millions of MT) 
ACS APS An" AW Soybean Supply Export (Equiv.)3 Export 
Region P Total Total Total Conv. RR Conv. RR Meal" 
Segregation cost: S19.8/MT 
USA 0.67 429 -256 396.3 569.6 23.0 45.6 23.0 0.0 4.3 
BR 0.52 245 -130 115.3 16.7 18.1 16.7 0.0 6.2 
AR 0.30 83 -77 6.6 14.4 6.2 14.4 0.0 1.3 
ROW 0.00 -1487 533 -954.1 33.8 0.0 -54.0 0.0 -11.8 
World -730 71 396.3 -262.6 
Segregation cost: S13.2/MT 
USA 0.65 353 -149 391.2 594.5 24.1 45.1 24.1 0.0 3.8 
BR 0.51 208 -76 132.0 17.2 17.8 17.2 0.0 6.0 
AR 0.30 72 -45 27.0 14.6 6.2 14.6 0.0 1.2 
ROW 0.00 -1021 363 -658.2 33.3 0.0 -56.0 0.0 -11.0 
World -389 93 391.2 95.4 
Segregation cost: S6.6/MT 
USA 0.64 277 -40 386.1 622.8 25.3 44.5 25.3 0.0 3.2 
BR 0.50 171 -21 150.6 17.8 17.6 17.8 0.0 5.8 
AR 0.29 61 -12 48.4 14.9 6.1 14.9 0.0 1.1 
ROW 0.00 -552 196 -355.5 32.9 0.0 -57.9 0.0 -10.1 
World -43 123 386.1 466.3 
Zero segregation cost 
USA 0.62 202 71 381.0 654.6 26.4 43.9 26.4 0.0 2.7 
BR 0.49 135 36 171.0 18.3 17.4 18.3 0.0 5.5 
AR 0.28 49 21 70.7 15.1 6.0 15.1 0.0 1.0 
ROW 0.00 -79 33 -46.2 32.4 0.0 -59.9 0.0 -9.3 
World 307 162 381.0 850.1 
a See footnote (a), Table CI. 
b See footnote (b), Table CI. 
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Table Cl 3. Economic Impact of the Simultaneous RR Production Bans in Brazil and the 
ROW and Import Ban in the ROW. No-LDP Scenario: Changes from Pre-Innovation 
Equilibrium. Production and Exports (millions of US $; quantities in millions of MT) 
ACS APS ADm AW Soybean Supply Export (Equiv.)3 Export 
Region P Total Total Total Conv. RR Conv. RR Mealb 
Segregation cost: S19.8/MT 
USA 0.70 638 -569 343.5 413.2 20.3 46.5 20.3 0.0 4.9 
BR 0.00 -178 422 244.0 37.9 0.0 21.9 0.0 4.5 
AR 0.32 111 -171 -59.4 13.7 6.4 13.7 0.0 1.3 
ROW 0.00 -1069 378 -691.3 33.4 0.0 -56.0 0.0 -10.8 
World -497 60 343.5 -93.6 
Segregation cost: S13.2/MT 
USA 0.67 498 -371 337.4 464.3 22.3 45.7 22.3 0.0 4.2 
BR 0.00 -124 284 160.1 37.1 0.0 21.0 0.0 4.7 
AR 0.31 92 -112 -20.0 14.2 6.2 14.2 0.0 1.3 
ROW 0.00 -727 256 -471.3 33.0 0.0 -57.4 0.0 -10.2 
World -261 57 337.4 133.1 
Segregation cost: S6.6/MT 
USA 0.65 359 -166 331.3 523.6 24.2 44.9 24.2 0.0 3.5 
BR 0.00 -70 152 81.1 36.4 0.0 20.0 0.0 4.8 
AR 0.30 72 -50 21.8 14.6 6.1 14.6 0.0 1.2 
ROW 0.00 -388 137 -251.0 32.7 0.0 -58.8 0.0 -9.6 
World -28 72 331.3 375.4 
Zero segregation ' cost 
USA 0.63 219 47 325.1 591.1 26.1 44.1 26.1 0.0 2.9 
BR 0.00 -17 24 6.9 35.7 0.0 19.1 0.0 5.0 
AR 0.29 52 14 66.0 15.1 6.0 15.1 0.0 1.1 
ROW 0.00 -52 21 -30.6 32.4 0.0 -60.3 0.0 -8.9 
World 203 106 325.1 633.5 
8 See footnote (a), Table CI. 
b See footnote (b), Table CI. 
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Table Cl 4. Economic Impact of the Simultaneous Production and Import Bans. 
No-LDP Scenario: Changes from No-Ban Scenario (millions of US $) 
RR Production and Import Ban in RR Production Bans in Brazil and 
the ROW ROW and Import Ban in ROW 
ACS APS AD" AW ACS APS An" AW 
Region Total Total Total Total Total Total 
Segregation cost: S19.8/MT 
USA 119 -161 -411 -452 328 -474 -463 -608 
BR 129 -213 -84 -294 339 45 
AR 42 -130 -88 70 -224 -154 
ROW -1618 401 -1217 -1200 246 -954 
World -1327 -102 -411 -1840 -1094 -113 -463 -1671 
Segregation cost: S13.2/MT 
USA 52 -66 -393 -408 197 -288 -447 -539 
BR 96 -166 -70 -236 194 -42 
AR 32 -102 -70 52 -169 -117 
ROW -1166 225 -941 -872 118 -754 
World -987 -108 -393 -1489 -859 -144 -447 -1451 
Segregation cost: S6.6MT 
USA 2 6 -304 -296 84 -120 -359 -396 
BR 74 -130 -55 -167 43 -125 
AR 25 -81 -56 36 -119 -82 
ROW -750 41 -709 -586 -18 -604 
World -649 -163 -304 -1116 -634 -214 -359 -1207 
Zero segregation cost 
USA 33 -49 -270 -285 50 -73 -326 -349 
BR 19 -25 -6 -133 -37 -170 
AR 6 -19 -12 9 -26 -17 
ROW -478 -78 -557 -451 -90 -542 
World -420 -170 -270 -860 -524 -226 -326 -1077 
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Table C15. Economic Impact of RR Technology in Alternative Market Structures. No-
LDP Scenario: Changes from Pre-Innovation and ^={0.4,0.2,0.2,0.2} Equilibria (mil. $) 
Vs. Pre-Innovation Equilibrium Vs. p. = {0.4,0.2,0.2,0.2} Equilibrium 
ACS APS ATI" AW ACS APS AD" AW 
Region P Total Total Total Total Total Total 
Markup p = {0,0,0,0} 
Segregation cost: S13.2/MT; free trade 
USA 0.95 459 141 0.0 600.4 158 224 -784 -402.5 
BR 1.00 162 74 236.7 50 -16 35.0 
AR 1.00 59 50 109.0 19 -7 12.1 
ROW 1.00 481 179 659.6 336 41 376.9 
World 1162 443 0.0 1605.7 564 242 -784 21.5 
Segregation cost: S13.2/MT; RR production bans in BR and ROW 
USA 1.00 214 536 0.0 750.4 101 321 -564 -140.5 
BR 0.00 66 -180 -113.6 31 -84 -52.9 
AR 1.00 26 168 194.7 12 20 32.6 
ROW 0.00 514 -165 349.5 243 -78 166.1 
World 822 359 0.0 1181.0 390 179 -564 5.3 
Markup p = {0.4,0.4,0.4,0.4} 
Segregation cost: S13.2/MT; free trade 
USA 0.90 247 8 1133.4 1387.8 -54 91 349 384.9 
BR 1.00 95 18 113.4 -17 -72 -88.3 
AR 1.00 33 14 46.6 -7 -43 -50.3 
ROW 1.00 17 18 35.0 -128 -120 -247.7 
World 392 58 1133.4 1582.8 -206 -143 349 -1.4 
Segregation cost: S13.2/MT; RR production bans in BR and ROW 
USA 1.00 100 236 635.1 971.4 -13 21 72 80.5 
BR 0.00 31 -85 -54.0 -4 11 6.7 
AR 1.00 12 82 94.7 -2 -66 -67.4 
ROW 0.00 240 -78 162.9 -31 9 -20.5 
World 384 156 635.1 1174.9 -48 -24 72 -0.8 
Monopolist profit maximizing markup; RR production bans in BR and ROW 
Segregation cost: S13.2/MT; markup p. = {1.498,0.0,0.2,0.0} 
USA 1.00 -149 -655 1794.4 990.4 -262 -870 1231 99.5 
BR 0.00 -46 129 83.3 -81 225 144.0 
AR 1.00 -18 287 269.0 -32 139 106.9 
ROW 0.00 -357 117 -240.4 -628 204 -423.8 
World -571 -122 1794.4 1102.2 -1003 -302 1231 -73.5 
Zero segregation cost; markup p = {0.733,0.0,0.2,0.0} 
USA 1.00 36 -61 955.6 931.3 -77 -276 392 40.4 
BR 0.00 11 -31 -19.7 -24 65 41.0 
AR 1.00 4 188 192.8 -10 40 30.7 
ROW 0.00 87 -28 58.7 -184 59 -124.7 
World 139 69 955.6 1163.1 -293 -111 392 -12.6 
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APPENDIX D. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS TABLES 
Table Dl. Model's Sensitivity to Demand Elasticities sm' : Welfare Effects3 (millions of US $) 
Base Values % 14 Base Values Base Values % 2 
Region P 
ACS APS An" 
Total Total 
AW 
Total P 
ACS 
Total 
APS An" 
Total 
AW 
Total P 
ACS APS An" 
Total Total 
AW 
Total 
Free Trade 
USA 0.90 359 -160 786 985 0.90 301 -83 784 1003 0.90 280 -52 785 1013 
BR 1.00 148 50 198 1.00 112 90 202 1.00 106 106 211 
AR 1.00 49 34 83 1.00 40 57 97 1.00 37 67 104 
ROW 1.00 231 102 333 1.00 145 138 283 1.00 91 152 243 
World 787 26 786 1599 598 201 784 1584 514 273 785 1571 
RR Production Ban in ROW 
USA 1.00 278 -50 675 902 1.00 239 9 675 922 1.00 233 19 675 927 
BR 1.00 98 107 206 1.00 81 137 218 1.00 85 142 228 
AR 1.00 36 68 104 1.00 30 85 116 1.00 31 88 119 
ROW 0.00 366 4 370 0.00 277 41 318 0.00 238 50 289 
World 778 128 675 1581 626 272 675 1573 588 300 675 1562 
RR Production Ban in Brazil 
USA 1.00 374 -192 712 894 1.00 326 -124 712 914 1.00 311 -101 713 923 
BR 0.00 -71 154 83 0.00 -94 188 93 0.00 -86 188 103 
AR 1.00 50 24 75 1.00 43 45 87 1.00 41 51 93 
ROW 1.00 373 87 460 1.00 291 118 409 1.00 251 129 379 
World 726 73 712 1512 565 226 712 1504 517 267 713 1498 
RR Prod. Bans in Brazil and ROW 
USA 1.00 131 185 565 881 1.00 113 215 564 891 1.00 135 181 562 878 
BR 0.00 41 -111 -71 0.00 35 -96 -61 0.00 51 -112 -60 
AR 1.00 16 139 156 1.00 14 148 162 1.00 18 138 156 
ROW 0.00 315 -101 214 0.00 271 -87 183 0.00 295 -102 193 
World 503 111 565 1179 432 180 564 1176 500 105 562 1167 
RR Prod, and Import Ban in ROW 
USA 0.64 340 -131 385 593 0.65 353 -149 391 595 0.68 420 -246 407 581 
BR 0.49 203 -67 137 0.51 208 -76 132 0.54 241 -125 117 
AR 0.29 70 -39 31 0.30 72 -45 27 0.32 83 -74 9 
ROW 0.00 -1063 373 -690 0.00 -1021 363 -658 0.00 -877 316 -561 
World -450 135 385 70 -389 93 391 95 -133 -129 407 145 
RR Prod. Bans in Brazil and ROW and Import Ban in ROW 
USA 0.65 487 -361 330 455 0.67 498 -371 337 464 0.71 567 -458 354 462 
BR 0.00 -128 293 165 0.00 -124 284 160 0.00 -94 236 142 
AR 0.30 90 -108 -19 0.31 92 -112 -20 0.33 103 -138 -35 
ROW 0.00 -754 262 -491 0.00 -727 256 -471 0.00 -606 213 -393 
World -305 85 330 110 -261 57 337 133 -30 -147 354 177 
a Assuming the S13.2/MT segregation cost in each region and no-LDP scenario 
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Table D2. Model's Sensitivity to Supply Elasticities iff : Welfare Effects8 (millions of US $) 
Base Values % 1/2 Base Values Base Values % 2 
ACS APS AW ACS APS An" AW ACS APS An" AW 
Region P Total Total Total P Total Total Total P Total Total Total 
Free Trade 
USA 0.90 281 -49 792 1024 0.90 301 -83 784 1003 0.89 320 -109 772 983 
BR 1.00 106 105 211 1.00 112 90 202 1.00 118 77 195 
AR 1.00 37 67 105 1.00 40 57 97 1.00 42 48 90 
ROW 1.00 94 152 246 1.00 145 138 283 1.00 191 126 317 
World 519 275 792 1586 598 201 784 1584 670 143 772 1585 
RR Production Ban in ROW 
USA 1.00 204 71 684 958 1.00 239 9 675 922 1.00 267 -39 659 887 
BR 1.00 70 164 234 1.00 81 137 218 1.00 89 118 207 
AR 1.00 26 103 129 1.00 30 85 116 1.00 34 71 105 
ROW 0.00 185 74 259 0.00 277 41 318 0.00 359 7 366 
World 484 411 684 1579 626 272 675 1573 750 157 659 1565 
RR Production Ban in Brazil 
USA 1.00 308 -95 725 938 1.00 326 -124 712 914 1.00 336 -136 692 891 
BR 0.00 -110 220 111 0.00 -94 188 93 0.00 -74 145 71 
AR 1.00 41 54 95 1.00 43 45 87 1.00 44 39 83 
ROW 1.00 231 131 363 1.00 291 118 409 1.00 346 112 458 
World 470 311 725 1506 565 226 712 1504 651 160 692 1502 
RR Prod. Bans in Brazil and ROW 
USA 1.00 87 264 572 924 1.00 113 215 564 891 1.00 131 175 549 855 
BR 0.00 27 -72 -45 0.00 35 -96 -61 0.00 41 -116 -75 
AR 1.00 11 160 171 1.00 14 148 162 1.00 16 142 158 
ROW 0.00 209 -67 143 0.00 271 -87 183 0.00 315 -104 212 
World 334 285 572 1191 432 180 564 1176 504 97 549 1149 
RR Prod, and Import Ban in ROW 
USA 0.64 366 -174 393 585 0.65 353 -149 391 595 0.69 344 -130 390 604 
BR 0.52 212 -84 128 0.51 208 -76 132 0.49 205 -72 132 
AR 0.30 74 -51 23 0.30 72 -45 27 0.29 71 -41 29 
ROW 0.00 -997 347 -650 0.00 -1021 363 -658 0.00 -1037 383 -653 
World -345 39 393 87 -389 93 391 95 -417 140 390 113 
RR Prod. Bans in Brazil and ROW and Import Ban in ROW 
USA 0.65 505 -391 339 453 0.67 498 -371 337 464 0.72 502 -357 337 481 
BR 0.00 -123 271 148 0.00 -124 284 160 0.00 -123 300 178 
AR 030 93 -114 -22 0.31 92 -112 -20 0.31 92 -114 -22 
ROW 0.00 -718 248 -470 0.00 -727 256 -471 0.00 -715 261 -454 
World -244 14 339 109 -261 57 337 133 -244 91 337 184 
" Assuming the S13.2/MT segregation cost in each region and no-LDP scenario 
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Table D3. Model's Sensitivity to the Yield Increase Parameter f3 : 
Welfare Effects8 (millions of US $) 
Base Values fi = 0.02 
ACS APS AD" AW ACS APS An" AW 
Region P Total Total Total P Total Total Total 
Free Trade 
USA 0.90 301 -83 784 1003 0.88 411 -288 770 893 
BR 1.00 112 90 202 1.00 146 -6 140 
AR 1.00 40 57 97 1.00 53 3 56 
ROW 1.00 145 138 283 1.00 409 51 459 
World 598 201 784 1584 1019 -240 770 1548 
RR Production Ban in ROW 
USA 1.00 239 9 675 922 1.00 333 -171 669 832 
BR 1.00 81 137 218 1.00 110 55 165 
AR 1.00 30 85 116 1.00 42 39 81 
ROW 0.00 277 41 318 0.00 498 -28 470 
World 626 272 675 1573 984 -105 669 1547 
RR Production Ban in Brazil 
USA 1.00 326 -124 712 914 1.00 419 -300 707 825 
BR 0.00 -94 188 93 0.00 -69 115 46 
AR 1.00 43 45 87 1.00 54 -1 53 
ROW 1.00 291 118 409 1.00 507 44 551 
World 565 226 712 1504 910 -142 707 1476 
RR Prod. Bans in Brazil and ROW 
USA 1.00 113 215 564 891 1.00 180 82 561 823 
BR 0.00 35 -96 -61 0.00 56 -153 -97 
AR 1.00 14 148 162 1.00 22 116 138 
ROW 0.00 271 -87 183 0.00 432 -139 293 
World 432 180 564 1176 690 -94 561 1157 
RR Prod, and Import Ban in ROW 
USA 0.65 353 -149 391 595 0.65 392 -239 386 539 
BR 0.51 208 -76 132 0.50 223 -122 101 
AR 0.30 72 -45 27 0.30 79 -71 7 
ROW 0.00 -1021 363 -658 0.00 -893 320 -573 
World -389 93 391 95 -198 -113 386 75 
RR Prod. Bans in Brazil and ROW and Import Ban in ROW 
USA 0.67 498 -371 337 464 0.66 523 -440 333 417 
BR 0.00 -124 284 160 0.00 -111 247 137 
AR 0.31 92 -112 -20 0.30 97 -131 -35 
ROW 0.00 -727 256 -471 0.00 -626 222 -404 
World -261 57 337 133 -117 -102 333 114 
a Assuming the S13.2/MT segregation cost in each region and no-LDP scenario 
104 
Table D4. Model's Sensitivity to Demand Parameter à : Welfare Effects8 (millions of US $) 
Base Values % % Base Values Base Values * 1 Vi 
ACS APS An" AW ACS APS An" AW ACS APS An" AW 
Region P Total Total Total P Total Total Total P Total Total Total 
Free Trade 
USA 0.87 335 -132 768 971 0.90 301 -83 784 1003 0.93 300 -81 801 1020 
BR 1.00 132 65 197 1.00 112 90 202 1.00 111 91 202 
AR 1.00 45 43 88 1.00 40 57 97 1.00 40 58 97 
ROW 1.00 21 115 136 1.00 145 138 283 1.00 317 138 456 
World 533 90 768 1391 598 201 784 1584 768 206 801 1775 
RR Production Ban in ROW 
USA 1.00 301 -85 673 889 1.00 239 9 675 922 1.00 184 94 679 957 
BR 1.00 114 89 203 1.00 81 137 218 1.00 57 181 238 
AR 1.00 40 57 97 1.00 30 85 116 1.00 23 111 134 
ROW 0.00 145 121 267 0.00 277 41 318 0.00 442 -142 300 
World 600 182 673 1455 626 272 675 1573 706 244 679 1629 
RR Production Ban in Brazil 
USA 1.00 391 -221 710 880 1.00 326 -124 712 914 1.00 264 -30 717 952 
BR 0.00 -99 222 123 0.00 -94 188 93 0.00 -46 77 30 
AR 1.00 53 15 68 1.00 43 45 87 1.00 34 74 108 
ROW 1.00 202 73 275 1.00 291 118 409 1.00 386 163 549 
World 546 90 710 1346 565 226 712 1504 638 283 717 1638 
RR Prod. Bans in Brazil and ROW 
USA 1.00 219 48 559 826 1.00 113 215 564 891 1.00 113 215 564 891 
BR 0.00 13 -32 -19 0.00 35 -96 -61 0.00 35 -95 -61 
AR 1.00 29 97 127 1.00 14 148 162 1.00 14 148 162 
ROW 0.00 239 -29 209 0.00 271 -87 183 0.00 270 -87 183 
World 500 84 559 1143 432 180 564 1176 431 181 564 1176 
RR Prod, and Import Ban in ROW 
USA 0.65 384 -196 391 580 0.65 353 -149 391 595 0.65 355 -152 392 594 
BR 0.51 227 -99 128 0.51 208 -76 132 0.51 209 -77 132 
AR 0.30 77 -59 18 0.30 72 -45 27 0.30 72 -46 27 
ROW 0.00 -975 342 -633 0.00 -1021 363 -658 0.00 -1017 362 -656 
World -286 -12 391 93 -389 93 391 95 -381 86 392 97 
RR Prod. Bans in Brazil and ROW and Import Ban in ROW 
USA 0.67 530 -418 337 449 0.67 498 -371 337 464 0.67 500 -373 338 464 
BR 0.00 -105 261 156 0.00 -124 284 160 0.00 -124 283 160 
AR 0.31 97 -126 -29 0.31 92 -112 -20 0.31 92 -112 -20 
ROW 0.00 -680 234 -446 0.00 -727 256 -471 0.00 -724 255 -470 
World -157 -49 337 131 -261 57 337 133 -256 53 338 134 
" Assuming the S13.2/MT segregation cost in each region and no-LDP scenario 
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Table D5. Model's Sensitivity to Demand Parameter k : Welfare Effects3 (millions of US $) 
k = 1.025 Base Values k = 1.075 
ACS APS AW ACS APS ADm AW ACS APS An" AW 
Region P Total Total Total P Total Total Total P Total Total Total 
Free Trade 
USA 0.90 298 -76 784 1006 0.90 301 -83 784 1003 0.90 335 -133 785 987 
BR 1.00 112 93 205 1.00 112 90 202 1.00 131 64 195 
AR 1.00 39 59 99 1.00 40 57 97 1.00 45 42 87 
ROW 1.00 132 140 272 1.00 145 138 283 1.00 207 114 321 
World 581 216 784 1581 598 201 784 1584 717 87 785 1590 
RR Production Ban in ROW 
USA 1.00 259 -19 672 913 1.00 239 9 675 922 1.00 249 -8 677 918 
BR 1.00 94 123 216 1.00 81 137 218 1.00 87 129 216 
AR 1.00 34 77 111 1.00 30 85 116 1.00 32 81 113 
ROW 0.00 302 24 326 0.00 277 41 318 0.00 301 33 334 
World 688 205 672 1566 626 272 675 1573 669 234 677 1580 
RR Production Ban in Brazil 
USA 1.00 335 -135 711 912 1.00 326 -124 712 914 1.00 346 -157 714 904 
BR 0.00 -87 179 92 0.00 -94 188 93 0.00 -82 172 90 
AR 1.00 44 41 86 1.00 43 45 87 1.00 46 35 81 
ROW 1.00 295 113 409 1.00 291 118 409 1.00 334 103 437 
World 588 198 711 1497 565 226 712 1504 644 153 714 1511 
RR Prod. Bans in Brazil and ROW 
USA 1.00 147 166 561 874 1.00 113 215 564 891 1.00 112 217 566 895 
BR 0.00 55 -119 -64 0.00 35 -96 -61 0.00 34 -95 -61 
AR 1.00 19 133 153 1.00 14 148 162 1.00 14 149 163 
ROW 0.00 315 -109 206 0.00 271 -87 183 0.00 271 -87 184 
World 537 71 561 1168 432 180 564 1176 431 184 566 1181 
RR Prod, and Import Ban in ROW 
USA 0.66 386 -190 395 591 0.65 353 -149 391 595 0.64 354 -157 388 585 
BR 0.52 228 -97 132 0.51 208 -76 132 0.50 208 -80 129 
AR 0.30 78 -57 20 0.30 72 -45 27 0.29 72 -47 25 
ROW 0.00 -966 343 -624 0.00 -1021 363 -658 0.00 -1027 360 -666 
World -274 -1 395 119 -389 93 391 95 -392 76 388 72 
RR Prod. Bans in Brazil and ROW and Import Ban in ROW 
USA 0.68 534 -412 340 462 0.67 498 -371 337 464 0.66 497 -379 335 454 
BR 0.00 -107 261 154 0.00 -124 284 160 0.00 -121 283 162 
AR 031 98 -124 -26 0.31 92 -112 -20 0.30 91 -114 -22 
ROW 0.00 -675 235 -440 0.00 -727 256 -471 0.00 -731 254 -477 
World -151 -40 340 150 -261 57 337 133 -263 44 335 116 
a Assuming the S13.2/MT segregation cost in each region and no-LDP scenario 
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Table D6. Model's Sensitivity to Demand Elasticities s00 : Welfare Effects3 (millions of US $) 
Demand Elasticities x % Base Values Demand Elasticities % ] % 
ACS APS An" 
Region P Total Total 
AW 
Total P 
ACS 
Total 
APS 
Total 
An" AW 
Total P 
ACS APS An" 
Total Total 
AW 
Total 
Free Trade 
USA 0.71 309 -96 693 906 0.90 301 -83 784 1003 0.95 309 -94 806 1021 
BR 1.00 118 83 201 1.00 112 90 202 1.00 115 84 199 
AR 1.00 41 53 95 1.00 40 57 97 1.00 41 54 95 
ROW 1.00 27 132 158 1.00 145 138 283 1.00 268 133 400 
World 495 172 693 1361 598 201 784 1584 732 177 806 1716 
RR Production Ban in ROW 
USA 1.00 284 -60 674 898 1.00 239 9 675 922 1.00 231 21 675 927 
BR 1.00 105 102 206 1.00 81 137 218 1.00 78 143 221 
AR 1.00 37 64 102 1.00 30 85 116 1.00 29 89 118 
ROW 0.00 217 120 337 0.00 277 41 318 0.00 331 -11  320 
World 643 226 674 1543 626 272 675 1573 670 242 675 1587 
RR Production Ban in Brazil 
USA 1.00 410 -253 709 865 1.00 326 -124 712 914 1.00 298 -79 715 933 
BR 0.00 -147 327 180 0.00 -94 188 93 0.00 -55 102 47 
AR 1.00 55 5 60 1.00 43 45 87 1.00 39 58 98 
ROW 1.00 252 58 309 1.00 291 118 409 1.00 333 139 473 
World 569 136 709 1414 565 226 712 1504 615 221 715 1551 
RR Prod. Bans in Brazil and ROW 
USA 1.00 146 167 564 876 1.00 113 215 564 891 1.00 113 215 564 891 
BR 0.00 55 -120 -65 0.00 35 -96 -61 0.00 35 -95 -61 
AR 1.00 19 134 153 1.00 14 148 162 1.00 14 148 162 
ROW 0.00 319 -109 210 0.00 271 -87 183 0.00 270 -87 183 
World 539 71 564 1174 432 180 564 1176 432 181 564 1176 
RR Prod, and Import Ban in ROW 
USA 0.65 384 -195 391 580 0.65 353 -149 391 595 0.65 354 -151 391 594 
BR 0.51 227 -99 128 0.51 208 -76 132 0.51 209 -77 132 
AR 0.30 77 -59 18 0.30 72 -45 27 0.30 72 -45 27 
ROW 0.00 -975 342 -633 0.00 -1021 363 -658 0.00 -1019 362 -657 
World -287 -11 391 93 -389 93 391 95 -384 89 391 96 
RR Prod. Bans in Brazil and ROW and Import Ban in ROW 
USA 0.67 530 -418 337 449 0.67 498 -371 337 464 0.67 500 -373 338 464 
BR 0.00 -105 261 156 0.00 -124 284 160 0.00 -124 284 160 
AR 0.31 97 -126 -29 0.31 92 -112 -20 0.31 92 -112 -20 
ROW 0.00 -680 234 -446 0.00 -727 256 -471 0.00 -725 255 -470 
World -159 -48 337 131 -261 57 337 133 -258 54 338 134 
" Assuming the SI3.2/MT segregation cost in each region and no-LDP scenario 
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Table D7. Possibility of Multiple Equilibria when Demand Elasticity £°° = -1.0 : Welfare 
Changes from Pre-Innovation Equilibrium, Production, and Exports8 (millions of US $; 
quantities in millions of MT) 
ACS APS ATI" AW Soybean Supply Export (Equiv.)b Export 
Region P Total Total Total Conv. RR Conv. RR Meal0 
Pre-innovation 
USA 0.00 70.3 27.5 1.8 
BR 0.00 35.7 19.1 5.0 
AR 0.00 21.1 15.4 0.9 
ROW 0.00 32.4 -62.0 -7.6 
Equilibrium #1 
USA 0.61 186 95 619.6 900.6 27.4 43.4 27.4 0.0 2.1 
BR 0.73 126 48 174.7 9.7 26.2 9.7 9.1 5.3 
AR 1.00 45 33 78.2 0.0 21.2 0.0 15.3 1.0 
ROW 1.00 -184 100 -84.3 0.0 32.6 -37.0 -24.4 -8.4 
World 173 276 619.6 1069.2 
Equilibrium #2 
USA 0.92 304 -96 635.9 843.8 5.3 64.5 5.3 20.5 2.5 
BR 1.00 108 83 191.3 0.0 36.1 0.0 19.0 5.3 
AR 1.00 39 53 92.8 0.0 21.3 0.0 15.4 0.9 
ROW 0.00 -133 389 256.5 33.5 0.0 -5.3 -55.0 -8.7 
World 319 429 635.9 1384.4 
a Assuming the S13.2/MT segregation cost in each region and no-LDP scenario 
b See footnote (a), Table CI, Appendix C. 
0 See footnote (b), Table CI, Appendix C. 
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Table D8. Model's Sensitivity to Transportation Costs® between Argentina and Brazil: Wel-
fare Changes from Pre-Innovation Equilibrium, Quantities and Pricesb (millions of US $) 
ACS APS AD" AW Soybean Supply Export (Equiv.)c Export 
Region P Total Total Total Conv. RR Conv. RR Meald 
USA 1.00 236 13 718.7 967.1 0.0 70.1 0.0 26.1 2.6 
BR 0.00 -49 18 -31.0 35.7 0.0 34.1 -15.2 0.0 
AR 1.00 30 86 116.0 0.0 21.4 0.0 15.5 6.3 
ROW 1.00 300 182 482.0 0.0 32.8 -34.1 -26.4 -8.8 
World 516 299 718.7 1534.1 
Bean Price Oil Price Meal Bean Demand Oil Demand Meal 
Conv. RR Conv. RR Price Conv. RR Conv. RR Demand 
USA 182.5 176.4 496.1 462.5 140.7 0.0 5.5 0.0 7.0 28.1 
BR 172.5 176.4 486.1 470.0 140.7 1.5 0.0 0.0 2.8 6.9 
AR 172.5 166.4 486.1 452.5 130.7 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 3.1 
ROW 212.5 206.4 556.1 522.5 170.7 7.1 9.2 4.9 9.0 70.2 
a Assuming transportation cost t H M  = 10./ ^ = 17.5./^ =10 
b Assuming the S13.2/MT segregation cost in each region and no-LDP scenario 
c See footnote (a), Table CI, Appendix C. 
d See footnote (b), Table CI, Appendix C. 
109 
APPENDIX E. SOLUTION ALGORITHM 
The model (4.1) - (4.13) is solved using GAUSS, the software equipped with eqSolve 
procedure that solves NxN systems of nonlinear equations by inverting the system's 
Jacobian (which is numerically computed within the procedure) while iterating until 
convergence. Needless to say, all equations must be binding. Thus the task is to apply 
eqSolve to the binding equations of the system (4.1) - (4.13). 
In our case, the number of binding equations in (4.1) - (4.13) is not determined a 
priori. There are two sources of ambiguity: the number of trade flows in each commodity, 
and the possible specialization in production of a particular soybean variety in each region. 
E.l. Trade Flows 
As was explained earlier, the present model cannot distinguish between exports of 
soybean oil/meal to a region and exports of soybeans for crush in that region. That is why I 
consider only situations when, if exists, trade flow in soybeans (soybean oil) implies no trade 
or a trade flow in the same direction for soybean oil (soybeans), subject to bean and oil being 
of the same variety. In other words, I do not consider situations like the United States 
exporting RR soybeans to the Rest of the World and importing RR oil from that region. This 
allows to bring trade flow analysis up to the "variety type" level of aggregation, but with 
soybean meal considered separately. 
Trade flow possibilities are numerous. However, what matters for the size of the 
system (4.1) - (4.13) is only the number of trade flows. For example, the maximum number 
of trade flows in the RR variety is three, and in that case equation (4.4) does not enter the 
model. If there is one trade flow, then there exist two regions that are in autarky and must 
satisfy (4.4). If there are no trade flows, then all four regions are in autarky and there are 
three equations (4.4), with equation (4.3) enforcing the autarky equilibrium in the fourth 
region. The same applies to the conventional variety. 
The number of trade flows in each variety affects the number of crushing equations 
(4.6) and (4.7). For example, with three trade flows in the RR variety, there is one equation 
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(4.7) (any region - trading partner - may be chosen). With one trade flow there are three 
equations (4.7): two for autarky regions and one for one of the two trading regions. 
Similarly, with no RR trade flows there must be four equations (4.7). 
E.2. Specialization in Production 
Equation (4.8) specifies that land allocation decision between conventional and RR 
soybeans (expressed by means of the adoption rate p) depends on the incentive compatibility 
constraint which binds when a region does not specialize. Therefore, if a region does not 
specialize and p, is determined by solving the system (4.1) - (4.13), the system gains one 
additional equation in the form of binding incentive compatibility constraint for that region i. 
If two regions produce both varieties, we gain two equations, and if four - four equations. 
To summarize, the number of binding equations in (4.1) - (4.13) can vary. If there 
are three trade flows in each variety and in undifferentiated meal (so that all Brazilian, 
Argentine and the Rest of the World prices can be expressed through U.S. prices) and all 
regions specialize in growing some soybean variety, than we have a system of five equations 
(4.1), (4.3), (4.5), (4.6) and (4.7) in five unknowns: U.S. conventional and RR bean and oil 
prices and a meal price. This is the smallest size we can get for the system. The largest 
possible size with differentiated markets developed only in the Rest of the World is twenty-
one: it arises when no region specializes in production and there is no trade in beans and oil 
of either variety. 
E.3. Computer Implementation 
GAUSS provides no capability to change the dimensions of the system of equations 
as it is being solved. Thus, in the case when differentiated markets exist only in the Rest of 
the World, the solution algorithm looks for the equilibrium by repeatedly solving the 
fluctuating-in-size binding portion of the system (4.1) - (4.13) over all possible combinations 
of the following assumptions: 
I l l  
• a region specializes in conventional soybeans, or in RR soybeans, or does not 
specialize - for each region; 
• there is no trade in RR beans/oil; 
• there is only one RR trade flow involving a pair of regions, in either direction, for all 
possible region pairs; 
• there are two RR trade flows, in all possible combinations of directions, excluding 
(for arbitrage reasons) cases when the same region is both exporter and importer of 
the same product(s); 
• there are three RR trade flows, in all possible combinations of directions, excluding 
(for arbitrage reasons) cases when the same region is both exporter and importer of 
the same produces). 
One of the above scenarios is the case of complete adoption of RR soybeans 
everywhere in the world, so the algorithm checks whether no differentiation is still an 
equilibrium. When each of the above scenarios is solved, the solution - if it exists - is 
checked against the remaining non-binding equations of the system (4.1) - (4.13). In 
particular, the non-binding incentive compatibility constraints are checked, actual trade flows 
are checked against the directions stipulated by (4.9) - (4.13), it is verified that trade takes 
place with a region with the lowest price (corrected for transportation costs), and demands 
and supplies are checked for being non-negative. 
When a differentiated market equilibrium satisfying the system (4.1) - (4.13) is 
found, the model solves the benchmark undifferentiated equilibrium using the algorithm 
developed by Moschini, Lapan and Sobolevsky (2000), which is a simpler version of the 
algorithm described herein, and computes consumer and producer surpluses, innovator-
monopolist's profit, and the subsidy to U.S. farmers. 
The full automation of the search for the equilibrium over all possible combinations 
of the above-described trade and production assumptions is achieved using the vector 
programming properties of GAUSS, in which any function and any procedure may be 
defined for a vector of unknown size. When solution algorithm needs to solve the system 
(4.1) - (4.13) of a particular size, it passes appropriately sized vectors of the system's 
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unknowns to the routines that "learn" through these vectors about a particular case of the 
system that must be solved. 
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